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A DIVERSION OF ATTENTION?
IMMIGRATION COURTS AND THE
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ABSTRACT
Because of fundamental changes in the nature of immigration
enforcement over the past decade, an increasing number of
interactions between law enforcement agents and noncitizens in the
United States are ultimately adjudicated not in criminal courts, but in
immigration courts. Unfortunately, unlike the state and federal courts
that have long performed an oversight function with regard to police
activity, immigration courts were not designed to police the police. As
a result, there are inadequate mechanisms in place to address many of
the rights violations that are occurring in the context of immigration
enforcement. This Article explores the procedural deficiencies of the
current system and offers some proposals to address this growing
problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Absent the applicability of the exclusionary rule, questions
relating to deportability routinely involve simple factual allegations
and matters of proof. When Fourth Amendment issues are raised at
deportation hearings, the result is a diversion of attention from the
main issues which those proceedings were created to resolve, both in
terms of the expertise of the administrative decision makers and of
the structure of the forum to accommodate inquiries into search and
seizure questions. The result frequently seems to be a long, confused
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record in which the issues are not clearly defined and in which there
is voluminous testimony.1

This is an era of unprecedented immigration enforcement. Never
before in the history of the United States has the government
removed so many noncitizens in so short a time frame. Between 2003
and 2008, the U.S. government removed 1,446,338 noncitizens from
2
the United States. And not all noncitizens placed in removal
proceedings were ultimately removed. Removals are merely the tip of
the iceberg with regard to enforcement actions. For every noncitizen
who receives a formal order of removal, another four depart
“voluntarily” as a result of their encounters with the immigration
3
enforcement bureaucracy. At the same time, federal prosecutions of
immigration crimes in criminal courts have reached an all-time high.
Over the past five years, immigration crimes have risen to the top of
the list of federal prosecutions, and now make up more than half of
4
the federal criminal docket.

1. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1984) (quoting In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 70, 79–80 (B.I.A. 1979)).
2. The government removed 358,886 noncitizens in 2008, 319,382 in 2007, 280,974 in 2006,
246,431 in 2005, 240,665 in 2004, and 211,098 in 2003. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 (2008),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf. The
first year in which annual removals exceeded 200,000 was 2003. Id. Removals exceeded 100,000
for the first time in 1997. Id.
Until 1996, immigration proceedings to prevent noncitizens from entering the country
were termed “exclusion” proceedings, whereas proceedings to remove a noncitizen that had
already entered the country were termed “deportation” proceedings. See STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY
420–21 (5th ed. 2009). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.), consolidated exclusion and deportation, and
labeled the resulting proceedings “removal” proceedings. Now, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3) indicates
that the removal proceedings defined in that section are for determining “whether an alien may
be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3) (2006). This Article will therefore use the term “removal” to refer
to deportation and exclusion.
3. In 2008, 811,263 noncitizens voluntarily departed, 891,390 noncitizens voluntarily
departed in 2007, 1,043,381 noncitizens voluntarily departed in 2006, 1,096,920 noncitizens
voluntarily departed in 2005, 1,166,576 noncitizens voluntarily departed in 2004, and 945,294
noncitizens voluntarily departed in 2003. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 2, at
95. Unlike formal removal statistics, voluntary departure statistics have been fairly constant
over the past thirty years. Id.
4. John Schwartz, Immigration Enforcement Fuels Spike in U.S. Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
22, 2009, at A16.
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Numerous agencies and adjudicators participate in the
enforcement actions that have yielded this unprecedented wave of
removals and convictions. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a
branch of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is
responsible for many of the apprehensions that take place on or near
5
the border. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), another
branch of DHS, is responsible for a great deal of the enforcement that
takes place in the interior of the country, although they perform
6
functions at the border as well. In recent years, ICE and CBP have
increasingly collaborated with law enforcement agents outside of the
immigration enforcement bureaucracy—including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA), and numerous state and local law enforcement agencies—to
7
facilitate interior enforcement efforts. Whether an individual is
detained at the border or in the interior, many noncitizens remain in
detention pending the resolution of their claims, and ICE is
8
responsible for managing this detention.
Immigration officers and other cooperating law enforcement
officers in the field engage in forms of policing that are entirely
familiar in the realm of criminal investigations, including conducting
brief stops of individuals suspected of immigration violations; full
arrest upon probable cause of these violations; consensual
questioning; and, with cause, interrogations concerning immigration
9
status. But what happens when these agents run afoul of
constitutional protections in the process of investigating immigration
violations or in the course of detaining noncitizens? For a noncitizen
facing a criminal trial, the answer would be clear. The noncitizen
could raise allegations of constitutional rights violations, and if a
5. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 3; Customs and Border Patrol, This Is
CBP, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbp_is.xml (last visited Mar. 28, 2010)
(discussing typical daily apprehensions).
6. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 3.
7. See, e.g., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security
Task Forces (BEST), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter BEST] (describing collaboration with “Customs and Border
Protection (CBP); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives; Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Coast Guard; and the U.S.
Attorney’s Office along with other key federal, state, local and foreign law enforcement
agencies”); U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE ACCESS, http://www.ice.gov/
partners/dro/iceaccess.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter ICE ACCESS] (describing
its collaboration with state and local law enforcement).
8. BEST, supra note 7.
9. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 649–50.
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violation was established, he might well be able to argue that
evidence illegally obtained in contravention of these constitutional
protections ought to be suppressed for purposes of adjudicating the
case against him.
But in hundreds of thousands of cases each year, noncitizens are
processed not in criminal courts, but in civil courts. Indeed, because
of fundamental changes in the nature of immigration enforcement
over the past decade, many of the interactions between law
enforcement officials and noncitizens in the United States lead to
matters that are ultimately adjudicated not in criminal courts, but in
10
immigration courts.
Once an individual has been served with a notice to appear
11
(NTA) in a civil removal proceeding, his case is adjudicated by an
immigration judge (IJ) who sits within the Executive Office of
Immigration Appeals, which is in turn under the jurisdiction of the
12
Department of Justice. The steep rise in immigration enforcement
has had a substantial impact on the workload of IJs. In fiscal year
2008, the immigration judges completed 274,469 removal
13
14
proceedings. Just over 200 IJs perform all of this work. Unlike

10. The focus of this Article is on civil removal proceedings, but it is worth bearing in mind
that the rise in criminal prosecutions also creates stresses on federal prosecutors and magistrate
judges. For a discussion of the rising caseload and the most affected areas of the country, see
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS AT
RECORD LEVELS IN FY 2009 (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/218/. Moreover, the
procedures designed to facilitate these convictions raise fundamental questions of fairness and
due process. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 147 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/109/135_
Chacon.pdf. The prosecution of immigration crimes also is facilitated by synergies with the civil
enforcement mechanisms used to effectuate removal. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting
Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 68–75, on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (describing the relationships between criminal prosecution and immigration
enforcement); see also Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms
and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 618 (2003) (describing this trend by noting
that “the [term] ‘criminalization’ of immigration law fails to capture the dynamic process by
which both systems converge at points to create a new system of social control that draws from
both immigration and criminal justice, but it is purely neither”).
11. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2009); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 650
(noting that NTAs are often served by ICE, but can be served by “a range of other DHS
agencies and officials”).
12. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 3–4.
13. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (EOIR), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY
2008 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK C4 tbl.4 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/stats
pub/fy08syb.pdf. The figure shown above for removal proceedings includes a small numbers of
“exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings. Id.
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federal judges, these IJs do not have a cadre of law clerks to assist
them; there are currently only fifty-six law clerks available to the
15
nation’s IJs. And these IJs face additional constraints—such as a
very high number of unrepresented and non–English-speaking
litigants and a lack of administrative support staff—that further
16
complicate their dockets and increase the burden of their workload.
17
Immigration judges have long faced fairly heavy dockets. In
recent years, however, the complexity of the docket has also
increased. For example, because an increasing number of noncitizens
in removal proceedings are detained, IJs must now adjudicate a
number of legal claims related to matters of detention. One sign of
this is the significant number of bond-related matters that IJs now
hear. In 2008, they adjudicated 44,736 bond redetermination
18
hearings. IJs must often decide these matters in isolation from
19
determinations of the merits of the noncitizen’s removal case.
But another important shift in the immigration docket in recent
years is the rise in the number of cases in which noncitizens raise
allegations of government misconduct in the course of investigating
immigration violations. Unfortunately, unlike state and federal
courts, which have long overseen police activity, immigration courts
were not designed to police the police. As the Supreme Court noted

14. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635,
1651–52 (2010).
15. Id. at 1652.
16. Id. at 1652–53.
17. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Court recorded that “[t]he
average immigration judge handles about six deportation hearings per day.” Id. at 1048.
18. EOIR, supra note 13, at C4 tbl.4, B7 fig.3. The Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR) figures also note that in 2008, IJs decided 13,294 motions to reopen and other
motions. Id.; see also Legomsky, supra note 14, at 1651–54 (providing more examples of the
strain on IJs).
19. Bond proceedings are not part of a removal proceeding; they are separate proceedings.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (2009) (“Consideration by the Immigration Judge of an application or
request of a respondent regarding custody or bond under this section shall be separate and apart
from, and shall form no part of, any deportation or removal hearing or proceeding.”). Unless a
noncitizen is subject to mandatory detention under the criminal or terrorism grounds of section
236(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006), the INA
provides for the release of noncitizens arrested for immigration violations on bond or on their
own recognizance pending resolution of their removal matter, INA § 236(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(2). An ICE official makes the initial custody and bond determination, INA § 236.1(d), 8
U.S.C. § 1236.1(d); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d), but at any time prior to the final removal order, a
noncitizen may apply for bond redetermination by an immigration judge, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d),
1003.19(a), 1236.1(d).
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20

in its 1984 decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, “a deportation
hearing is intended to provide a streamlined determination of
21
eligibility to remain in this country, nothing more.”
The executive branch—in cooperation with law enforcement
agents at all levels of government—has fundamentally transformed
the nature of immigration enforcement over the past decade, but
immigration adjudication has not evolved to meet the growing
challenge of overseeing ongoing and widespread interagency
immigration policing in the interior of the United States. Not only do
IJs face the tremendous resource constraints previously described,
but the remedies that they can provide in cases in which an
individual’s rights have been violated in the investigation stage are
also heavily constrained by a body of law that formed at a time when
22
immigration enforcement looked very different than it does today.
This Article explores the procedural deficiencies of the current
system and offers some proposals to address the growing problems
created by the mismatch between enforcement realities and the
adjudicative capacity and competence of the immigration courts.
Part I of this Article discusses two trends in immigration
enforcement that have created a situation in which many interactions
between noncitizens and the state lead to matters that are ultimately
adjudicated not in criminal courts, but in immigration courts. The first
trend, discussed in Section I.A, is the rapid expansion of immigration
enforcement efforts, particularly outside of border areas. The second
trend, discussed in Section I.B, is the increasing permeability of the
border between immigration enforcement and crime-control
measures. As a consequence of these two developments, immigration
enforcement actions now number over 300,000 each year in the civil
realm, in addition to the tens of thousands of cases that are handled in
the criminal sphere. The law enforcement officials participating in
these actions include not only ICE and CBP but also a wide range of
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies whose primary
functions are outside of the realm of immigration enforcement.
Part II of this Article discusses the specific ways in which state
and local police have become involved in a wide variety of

20. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
21. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).
22. As discussed below, many of the assumptions about immigration enforcement
underlying the Lopez-Mendoza decision are no longer valid in light of evolving enforcement
practices. See infra Part III.B.
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immigration enforcement efforts. This Part analyzes evolving models
of federal-local cooperation and also offers a preliminary discussion
of some of the legal issues that have arisen as a result of local-statefederal law enforcement cooperation, including increasingly
widespread allegations of racial profiling and other constitutional
violations.
Drawing upon these examples of local-federal cooperation, Part
III of the Article seeks to provide a procedural explanation for the
increasing allegations of rights violations that have occurred in the
context of immigration enforcement efforts. This Part traces out the
legal incentive structures that produce some of the negative
consequences of the cooperative enforcement described in Part II.
Not only do constitutional violations lack remedies in removal
proceedings comparable to those available in the criminal sphere, but
immigration enforcement agents also have broader authority to
conduct investigative stops because they are empowered to enforce
civil immigration law as well as criminal law. As state and local law
enforcement become more engaged in immigration policing, the lack
of alignment between immigration policing powers and criminal
policing powers and the asymmetrical nature of remedies raise new
concerns. Nonfederal actors who are using immigration enforcement
powers to achieve their criminal law objectives are able to circumvent
some of the constitutional baselines that apply to criminal policing
without confronting the sanctions that would be available in the
criminal system.
The final Part of the Article proposes policy reforms to address
the procedural problems previously identified. Part IV.A suggests the
application of the exclusionary rule to removal proceedings.
Ultimately, however, many of the rights claims arising out of localfederal cooperation in immigration enforcement exceed the core
competencies and capacities of the immigration courts that handle the
bulk of these claims. There is a need for comprehensive reform of the
immigration adjudication structure. Part IV.B urges a reform of the
administrative structure of immigration adjudication and discusses
the need to guarantee counsel in at least some subset of removal
23
proceedings. Part IV also proposes mechanisms for increasing the
oversight of immigration policing outside of the immigration court
system. Part IV.C explores two options: expanded availability of
class-action remedies in federal district court and improved agency
23. See infra Part IV.B.
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oversight procedures for federal immigration enforcement agents.
Ultimately, the task of bringing immigration adjudication into
alignment with the modern realities of immigration policing will
require a comprehensive approach.
I. THE RISE AND REFORMULATION
OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Immigration enforcement has waxed and waned throughout the
past century in the United States, but it has exploded over the past
decade. Enforcement has morphed from a small and border-centered
endeavor into a huge effort involving a network of law enforcement
agencies operating throughout the country. Perhaps more
significantly, immigration enforcement has transformed into a crucial
adjunct to, if not a substitute for, criminal law enforcement in matters
involving noncitizens. This Part traces both of these trends and
outlines their practical effects.
A. The Rising Tide of Immigration Enforcement
In fiscal year 2008, the U.S. government spent billions of dollars
on immigration enforcement activities. Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement, the agency responsible for immigration enforcement
activities in the interior of the country, had a budget of
25
$5,014,500,000. Customs and Border Protection, which includes the
Border Patrol, as well as other enforcement agencies focusing on the
flow of goods and people across the U.S. borders, had a budget of
26
$10,174,114,000. The two agencies combined therefore had
27
operating budgets of over $15 billion in fiscal year 2008. By way of
comparison, in 1998, the budget for the Immigration and
28
Naturalization Service (INS) was just over $3.6 billion. This figure
includes immigration services that are now provided by Citizenship
and Immigration Services (CIS) and are not included in the $15
24. See infra Part IV.C.
25. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 19 (2008),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2008.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id. This number does not include interdiction activities carried out by the Coast Guard,
which carries out interdictions of noncitizens at sea. The Coast Guard accounted for an
additional 18.9 percent of the DHS budget. Id.
28. Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, An Overview of Federal Drug Control Programs
on the Southwest Border: Immigration and Naturalization Service, http://www.ncjrs.gov/
ondcppubs/publications/enforce/border/ins_3.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
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billion figure above. Additionally, although these budget figures
reflect DHS spending on investigations, prosecutions, detention, and
removal, they do not reflect all of the federal costs of immigration
enforcement, given the costs of prosecuting and punishing
immigration crimes in criminal courts. Even so, the $15 billion budget
for ICE and CBP represents a budget increase of over 500 percent in
29
the past decade, and more than a 1,500 percent increase since 1988.
Even as federal immigration enforcement is expanding, the
nature of that enforcement is changing. Internal enforcement
measures have seen a significant increase in budget and prominence
in the U.S. government’s immigration control strategy, particularly
30
over the past five years. Prior to September 11, 2001, the INS had
fewer than two thousand agents to enforce immigration laws in the
31
interior of the United States. Although the agency had expanded
significantly over the preceding two decades, that expansion was
32
primarily in the realm of border enforcement. As the contemporary
CBP budget suggests, significant resources are still dedicated to
border enforcement, but over the past decade, interior enforcement
has become an increasingly important component of immigration
33
enforcement. In 2010, ICE will have 20,000 employees, many of
whom are dedicated to internal enforcement efforts.

29. JUSTICE MGMT. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET TREND DATA: FROM 1975
THROUGH THE PRESIDENT’S 2003 REQUEST TO THE CONGRESS 104–08 (2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975_2002/2002/pdf/BudgetTrand.pdf
(showing
budget
trends for INS from 1975 to 2003 and recording an INS budget of $1.01 billion in 1988).
30. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) Interior Enforcement Strategy:
Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 13 (2002)
(statement of Richard M. Stana, Director of Justice Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office)
(noting that up through the 1990s, five times as many resources were devoted to border
enforcement as to interior enforcement); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 25, at 2
(noting an unprecedented number of workplace enforcement actions in 2008).
31. LISA M. SEGHETTI, STEPHEN R. VIÑA & KARMA ESTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT 6 (2005),
available at http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2005,1026-crs.pdf.
32. See, e.g., TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 10 (noting
the rapid expansion of the Border Patrol in the period from the mid-1970s through 2001); INS:
Enforcement, Detention, MIGRATION NEWS, Apr. 1998, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/MN/
more.php?id=1489_0_2_0 (noting that the number of Border Patrol agents doubled between
1993 and 1998).
33. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE
FISCAL YEAR 2010 ENACTED BUDGET 1 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/
news/factsheets/2010budgetfactsheet.doc.
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Not only has the size of U.S. interior enforcement rapidly
increased, but the nature of that enforcement has also changed in
fundamental ways. As Julia Preston wrote for the New York Times in
late 2007, “[o]ver the last two years, ICE has grown more aggressive,
entering factories and communities, hunting down foreign fugitives
ranging from convicted criminals to workers whose visas have
34
expired.” Moreover, the federal immigration enforcement strategy
has come to rely heavily upon thousands of state and local law
35
enforcement agents who assist in interior immigration enforcement.
B. Blurring Boundaries: Immigration Enforcement as Crime Control
The rise of interior enforcement and the participation of a wide
array of law enforcement agents in immigration enforcement raise
fundamental questions about age-old legal doctrines that rely on
clear-cut distinctions between immigration law and criminal law
enforcement. U.S. legal doctrines have historically framed
deportation as a “civil” punishment that does not require the full
panoply of criminal procedural protections afforded in criminal
36
trials. As Professor Dan Kanstroom has noted, at the time that the
Supreme Court handed down such edicts, deportation looked very
different than it does today. Strict statutes of limitations on
37
deportation were ensconced in the statute —indeed, after a year in
38
the United States, a person was no longer subject to deportation.

34. Julia Preston, No Need for a Warrant, You’re an Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007,
§ 4 (Week in Review), at 3; see also BESS CHIU ET AL., CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON
IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERATIONS (2009), available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/
uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-741/IJC_ICE-Home-RaidReport%20Updated.pdf (noting the constitutional problems associated with ICE home raids in
New York and New Jersey); NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS, RAIDS ON WORKERS: DESTROYING OUR RIGHTS 13–41 (2009),
available at http://www.icemisconduct.org/docUploads/UFCW%20ICE%20rpt%20FINAL%20
150B_061809_130632.pdf (reporting on aggressive tactics and rights violations by ICE in the
course of several large-scale workplace raids across the country).
35. Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration
Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1161–65 (2008). For details concerning this
cooperation, see discussion infra Part II.
36. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 122–24 (2007); see also, e.g., Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233 (1896) (stating that Chinese laborers did not require
the full range of protections under the criminal justice system).
37. KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 125.
38. Id.
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Additionally, there was almost no interior enforcement, so
39
deportation primarily resulted from patrolling the borders.
Much has changed in the past century. Statutes of limitations for
unlawful presence were first truncated, and then eliminated
40
completely. Interior enforcement is now an important component of
41
immigration enforcement. Moreover, deportation has increasingly
come to be used as an adjunct to criminal punishment, operating as a
42
means of “post-entry social control.” Now, when a noncitizen—even
a lawful permanent resident—commits any one of a host of offenses,
43
he often faces deportation in addition to criminal punishment. Since
immigration enforcement is increasingly functioning in the interior as
a means of achieving criminal law enforcement goals, the immigration
consequences of detention and removal are of a punitive nature that
44
belies their designation as civil.
The past two decades have witnessed the evolution of
“crimmigration” law: parallel systems “in which immigration law and
45
the criminal justice system are merely nominally separate.” The
overlap between the two systems has several distinct manifestations,
including a dramatic rise in the prosecution of migration-related
criminal offenses within the criminal justice system, increasing
reliance on removal as a collateral (or alternative) form of punishing
crime or suspected criminality, and the use of quasi-criminal
institutions—such as immigration detention and investigatory raids by

39. Id.
40. Id. at 125–30.
41. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
42. KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 243.
43. See Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the
Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 652 (2004)
(“Deportation is now often a virtually automatic consequence of a non-citizen’s criminal
conviction for even a minor state misdemeanor.”); Stephen Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 469, 482 (2007) (“Just as more and more immigration violations are culminating in
criminal convictions, so too are more and more criminal convictions culminating in deportation
or other adverse immigration consequences.”); Miller, supra note 10, at 618 (referring to this
trend as the “immigrationization of criminal law”).
44. See infra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
45. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006).
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numerous, heavily armed agents—in what are nominally purely civil
46
immigration investigations and proceedings.
The spike in migration-related criminal convictions is perhaps
one of the most notable features of the past decade of federal law
enforcement in the United States. Immigration prosecutions are now
the most common federal criminal prosecutions, outstripping federal
drug and weapons prosecutions, and dwarfing many other forms of
47
federal criminal prosecution. Indeed, recent data indicate that
48
immigration offenses now make up half of federal criminal cases.
Illegal reentry and felony reentry are by far the most commonly
prosecuted immigration crimes, but other immigration-related
prosecutions are also on the rise. In spite of vocal commitment to
immigration reform, the Obama administration has continued to
49
engage in record-setting levels of immigration prosecution.
Prosecutions for immigration-related offenses are also unfolding
with increasing regularity at the subfederal level. Although as a
historical matter the federal government bears sole responsibility for
the regulation of immigration, states and localities are increasingly
enacting provisions that, like the federal identity-theft statute, can be
50
used to target conduct associated with migrant communities. In
some jurisdictions, these laws have become a means for state and

46. See Chacón, supra note 10, at 137–40 (discussing the consequences of the overlap of the
immigration and criminal law systems). See generally Legomsky, supra note 43 (discussing five
related trends).
47. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, PROSECUTION OF
IMMIGRATION CASES SURGE IN U.S. WHILE SENTENCES SLUMP (2005), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/131/ (“Fueled by the jump in DHS-immigration referrals in FY
2004, immigration matters now represent the single largest group of all federal prosecutions,
about one-third (32%) of the total. By comparison, narcotics and drugs, for many years the
government’s dominant enforcement interest, dropped to about a quarter of the total (27%)
and weapons matters to slightly less than one out of ten (9%).”).
48. Schwartz, supra note 4.
49. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 10.
50. One example is Arizona’s identity-theft law. Arizona law creates criminal culpability
for the use of an alternate identity whether or not the defendant knows that he is using the
identity of an actual person and whether or not another person with such an identity actually
exists. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008 (2010). This offense is deployed as a means of
prosecuting noncitizens who have used false identities to obtain employment. For more
examples of state legislation allowing prosecution for migration-related offenses, see Juliet P.
Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1557, 1599 n.224 (2008).
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local governments to focus on immigrant populations for
51
prosecution.
Not only are immigration prosecutions on the rise, but, as
previously noted, the collateral immigration consequences of
noncitizens’ criminal convictions have also become increasingly
52
punitive. Over the past two decades, Congress has passed a number
of provisions that require or permit deportation as a collateral
53
consequence of a growing number of criminal convictions. Thus,
once an individual has been convicted of certain types of criminal
offenses, those criminal convictions become the basis for their
expulsion from the country in civil removal proceedings.
The collateral sanction of removal now applies in a broad array
of criminal cases. For example, the law currently requires that any
noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony be deported, regardless
54
of the equities of his case. For over two decades, the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) had specified that noncitizens convicted of
55
aggravated felonies were deportable. Two laws passed in 1996—the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
56
(IIRIRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
57
(AEDPA) —changed the operation of this provision in draconian
51. See Valerie Fernández, Profiling Persists Despite Revamped Guidelines, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, July 30, 2009, http://www.ipsnews.org/news.asp?idnews=47894 (relaying the argument
of Aarti Shahani, Researcher, Justice Strategies, that Arizona officials do not need federal
government contracts to enforce immigration law because the Arizona code provides such
broad tools to law enforcement). See generally Chacón, supra note 10 (documenting a
simultaneous increase in immigration prosecutions and an erosion of criminal protections for
immigration defendants).
52. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1844 (2007) (noting a number of increasingly
punitive penalties relating to immigration); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2087–88 (2008) (explaining the severity of the proposed
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act). See generally
Kanstroom, supra note 43, at 651–52 (“[W]e live in a time of extreme ‘vigor, efficiency, and
strictness’ as to deportation of non-citizens convicted of crimes, due to nearly two decades of
sustained attention to this issue.” (footnote omitted)); Legomsky, supra note 43, at 482–86
(discussing the increasingly severe immigration consequences that follow from noncitizens’
criminal convictions); Miller, supra note 10, at 631–39 (discussing the increasingly common
imposition of deportation on noncitizens who commit certain kinds of criminal offenses).
53. Chacón, supra note 52, at 1844; Legomsky, supra note 43, at 471.
54. INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226.1 (2006).
55. Id.
56. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
57. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
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ways. Not only did these laws greatly expand the definition of
58
“aggravated felonies,” but IIRIRA also eliminated the ability of an
immigration judge to provide relief from deportation in cases in
59
which the equities favored that relief. Congress also added to the list
of offenses other than aggravated felonies that render a noncitizen
deportable or excludable. For example, Congress mandated that even
very minor drug crimes are grounds for exclusion and deportation,
and has provided almost no relief for lawful permanent residents or
60
unauthorized migrants charged under these provisions. The
expansion of immigration consequences for drug crimes coincided
61
with the “war on drugs,” and the harshness of the resulting legal
62
regime has been the subject of sustained scholarly criticism.
Finally, even when no criminal charges are at stake, the
administrative measures that the government employs to achieve civil
immigration goals increasingly resemble criminal punishment. ICE
63
agents conduct militarized raids in both criminal and civil matters.
DHS also imposes protracted detentions, sometimes under very harsh
conditions, upon many migrants (including refugees) who are either
attempting to establish their admissibility or contesting their

58. Chacón, supra note 52, at 1827. For the complete definition of “aggravated felony,” see
INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
59. Chacón, supra note 52, at 1845; see also BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS:
VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 54–58 (2006) (discussing the severity of
immigration law and associated punishments). See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding
the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000) (discussing the changes to the law and critiquing reform proposals).
60. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h); see also Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Drug
Inadmissibility, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 166–67 (2008) (discussing the broad scope of the
drug inadmissibility provision and the limited nature of waiver); Jeff Yates, Todd A. Collins &
Gabriel J. Chin, A War on Drugs or a War on Immigrants? Expanding the Definition of “Drug
Trafficking” in Determining Aggravated Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 MD. L. REV. 875, 878–
79 (2005) (highlighting certain inequities of the sentencing system as it currently stands).
61. See Yates et al., supra note 60, at 876 (suggesting a strong causality between the war on
drugs and the severity of immigration law on drug offenses); see also Morawetz, supra note 60,
at 166–67 (commenting on the “zero tolerance” policy on inadmissibility over even the most
minor of offenses).
62. See, e.g., Morawetz, supra note 60; Yates et al., supra note 60.
63. CHIU ET AL., supra note 34, at 1 (“[ICE] home raids generally involve teams of heavily
armed ICE agents making predawn tactical entries into homes, purportedly to apprehend some
high priority target believed to be residing therein. ICE has admitted that these are warrantless
raids and, therefore, that any entries into homes require the informed consent of residents.
However, frequent accounts in the media and in legal filings have told a similar story of
constitutional violations occurring during ICE home raids—a story that includes ICE agents
breaking into homes and seizing all occupants without legal basis.”); NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE
MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 35.
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64

Indeed, immigration detention facilities now
deportability.
65
constitute the fastest-growing segment of the prison industry. Over
the past decade, bed space in immigration detention facilities has
66
risen from just over 8,000 beds in 1996 to 27,500 in 2006. “By the end
of 2009, the U.S. government will have more than 440,000 people in
immigration custody” annually—three times the number of a decade
67
ago. Immigrants who are awaiting the completion—and in some
68
cases, the initiation —of their civil removal proceedings are often
housed in the same facilities as criminal offenders and are treated
69
much like criminal detainees. This is true even though most lack any
criminal record whatsoever, and a significant number of those who do
have criminal records are guilty of the migration-related offenses of
70
entry without inspection or felony reentry.

64. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants
Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541,
551–52 (2009) (providing a case study about the barriers to litigating immigration claims from an
immigration detention facility); Nina Bernstein, For a Mentally Ill Immigrant, a Path Clears Out
of the Dark Maze of Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at A20 (detailing the harsh
conditions in immigration detention for a mentally ill detainee); Nina Bernstein, Officials
Obscured Truth of Migrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at A1 (discussing
numerous immigrant deaths in detention and the agency cover-up of the details of these
deaths).
65. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/
immigration-detention-overview-and-recommendations; see also Nina Bernstein, Report Critical
of Scope and Cost of Immigration Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A17 (highlighting the
significant and potentially wasteful costs associated with current detention facilities).
66. Compare U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FY2002 BUDGET SUMMARY 114 (2001), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/2002summary/pdf/ins_breached_bond.pdf (providing 1996
data), with U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
OFFICE OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL: KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2006),
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/dro110206.htm (providing 2006 data).
67. Jared Polis, The Case for Detention Reform, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 15, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jared-polis/case-for-detention-reform_b_287260.html. This is
also double the number that the American Bar Association reported to be detained in 2004.
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, IMMIGRATION DETAINEE PRO BONO OPPORTUNITIES
GUIDE 1 (2004), available at http:// www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/probonoguidefinal.
pdf.
68. DONALD KERWIN & SERENA YI-YING LIN, IMMIGRANT DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET
ITS LEGAL IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 1 (2009), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf (noting that on a given day,
more than half of the noncitizens in immigration detention had not received final orders of
removal).
69. SCHRIRO, supra note 65, at 21–22.
70. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 68, at 20–21 (noting that 58 percent of the detainees had no
criminal record, and that of those who did, the “most serious” convictions for 6 percent of them
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These trends—the increasing prosecution of immigration crimes,
the use of the civil removal system as an adjunct for criminal
punishment, and the criminalization of the means and mechanisms of
civil removal—have all contributed to the criminalization of
immigration in the United States. One of the most interesting cultural
repercussions of this transformation in the landscape of immigration
enforcement is that it has substantially changed the discourse around
unauthorized migration. As immigration control increasingly
functions as an adjunct to crime control, the role of local law
enforcement in immigration control has been reimagined. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, local law enforcement officials who have previously
had very little role in immigration enforcement are now participating
71
in significant immigration-control efforts.
The recent rise of local law enforcement participation in
immigration enforcement demonstrates the shallowness of the fiction
of deportation as a civil remedy distinct from criminal punishment.
The involvement of state and local law enforcement officers in
immigration control illustrates both that these officials understand
immigration enforcement as an indirect means of achieving some of
their own crime-control goals and that these officials see immigration
violations as crime problems in and of themselves. The next Part
explores the various ways in which state and local law enforcement
have begun to participate in immigration enforcement efforts.
II. DECENTRALIZING ENFORCEMENT: THE RISE OF STATE
AND LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN MIGRATION CONTROL
Over the past decade, state and local police have become
involved in a wide variety of immigration enforcement efforts. This
relatively recent development marks a very significant transformation
in the role of state and local police. In 1996, the Department of
Justice issued a memorandum that outlined the limits of state and
72
local authority to enforce immigration laws. The memorandum
concluded that state and local officials did not have the authority to

were immigration offenses, whereas the most serious convictions for another 13 percent were
traffic violations).
71. Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1118–19 (2009).
See generally Stumpf, supra note 50 (describing and theorizing the trend).
72. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, BACKGROUNDER: IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT
BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE 1 (2004), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/
images/uploads/Backgrounder-StateLocalEnforcement.pdf.
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73

enforce civil immigration laws. Thus, a state or local police officer
could not detain a noncitizen based on the noncitizen’s presence
without current authorization, because that is a mere civil violation,
74
not a criminal offense. On the other hand, if the officers had
probable cause to make an arrest for a criminal violation of the
immigration law, such as illegal reentry or alien smuggling, they were
75
authorized to do so under their inherent law enforcement authority.
In 1996, Congress expanded the power of state and local law
76
enforcement to enforce federal immigration law. First, AEDPA
formally authorized those officers to arrest and detain unlawfully
present noncitizens who had “previously been convicted of a felony in
77
the United States.” Second, IIRIRA empowered the attorney
general (now the secretary of DHS) to authorize local officials to
enforce civil immigration laws when “an actual or imminent mass
influx of aliens . . . presents urgent circumstances requiring an
78
immediate Federal response.” Finally, IIRIRA added section 287(g)
to the Immigration and Nationality Act to allow the attorney general
to delegate immigration enforcement authority to state and local
police pursuant to a formal agreement between the state or local
agency and the Department of Justice, provided the state or local
officers have undergone adequate training to enforce the immigration
79
laws. Such agreements, now increasingly common, are often referred
to as “287(g) agreements.”
73. Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 26, 32 (1996) (“[S]tate and local police lack recognized legal authority to stop and
detain an alien solely on suspicion of civil deportability, as opposed to criminal violations of the
immigration laws or other laws.”).
74. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRIMINALIZING UNLAWFUL
PRESENCE: SELECTED ISSUES 2 (2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/
P585.pdf (“Although an alien who unlawfully enters the United States is potentially subject to
removal and criminal prosecution, an alien found unlawfully present in the U.S. is typically
subject only to removal.”).
75. See Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel at 27 (“Subject to the provisions of state law, state and local police may
constitutionally detain or arrest aliens who have violated the criminal provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
76. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72, at 3, 5.
77. AEDPA, 8 U.S.C. §1252c (2006); see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72,
at 3–4 (describing the changes in the law).
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10); see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72, at 3–4
(describing the changes in the law); NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., SAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR
POLICIES LIMITING THE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES 2–3
(2004) (same).
79. INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g); NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72, at 2.
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After September 11, 2001, the role of state and local law
enforcement in enforcing immigration laws, particularly civil
80
immigration laws, became increasingly murky. The Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) in the Justice Department under Attorney General
John Ashcroft revised the 1996 memorandum regarding the role of
state and local police in immigration enforcement, concluding that
state and local law enforcement had “inherent authority” to arrest
81
and detain immigration violators, including civil violators. But the
OLC memo was not immediately released. Instead, then–White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales issued a 2002 letter to the
Migration Policy Institute suggesting a more moderate position than
82
the unconstrained “inherent authority” position taken by OLC.
Gonzales’s memo indicated that state and local police had authority
“to arrest and detain persons who are in violation of immigration laws
and whose names have been placed in the National Crime
83
Information Center (NCIC).” But even this more limited authority
signaled a definite broadening of state and local police power,
because the NCIC then (as now) included civil violators of the
84
immigration law.
In the wake of this confusion, state and local police officers
began to participate in immigration enforcement in a variety of forms.
The remainder of this Part discusses three different forms of state and

80. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 72, at 2.
81. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to the U.S. Att’y Gen., Regarding Non-Preemption of the Authority of State
and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations (Apr. 3,
2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION
FORUM, supra note 72, at 5 (discussing the Justice Department’s 2002 policy change regarding
civil violations); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787, 801–02 (2008) (discussing the OLC memo and the varied responses taken
by states and localities in asserting their “inherent authority”); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws
in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 966 (2004) (same).
82. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G.
Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute (June 24, 2002), available at http://www.migration
policy.org/files/whitehouse.pdf; see also Pham, supra note 81, at 987 (discussing and contesting
the reasoning of the letter).
83. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G.
Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute, supra note 82; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION
FORUM, supra note 72, at 5 (discussing the Justice Department’s 2002 inclusion of civil
offenders in the database); Pham, supra note 81, at 987 (discussing the letter).
84. Cf. Kalhan, supra note 35, at 1162–63 (critiquing this development); Michael J.
Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Law, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084,
1086 (2004) (same).
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local involvement in federal immigration enforcement. Section II.A
addresses state and local cooperation pursuant to intergovernmental
memoranda of agreement. Section II.B discusses a range of programs
that fall under the broad umbrella of the “ICE ACCESS” programs.
Section II.C focuses on a recently developed and expanding
cooperation initiative known as the “Secure Communities initiative.”
Each of these Sections provides illustrations of the ways in which
particular forms of cooperation can lead to procedural-rights
violations.
A. Section 287(g) Agreements
Among the most oft-discussed examples of state-local
collaboration in immigration enforcement are the partnerships
between the Department of Homeland Security and state and local
86
law enforcement agencies known as “287(g) agreements.” Section
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which became law in
1996, allows for the cross-designation of certain trained state or local
87
law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration law. As of
December 2009, ICE had signed sixty-three memoranda of agreement
88
(MOAs) with state and local law enforcement agencies. According
85. At the same time that states and localities are increasing their participation in the
enforcement of federal immigration law, they are also increasing the roles of their law
enforcement officials in policing migration by enacting immigration-related legislation at the
state and local level. For additional discussions of this development, see Jennifer M. Chacón,
Tensions and Tradeoffs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement,
158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 81–87, on file with the Duke Law
Journal); Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting
Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 580–81 (2009); Pham, supra note 71, at
1118–19 (2009); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Federal Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 582–90 (2008); Stumpf, supra note 50, at 1559–60; Rick Su,
A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1622–24 (2008). See
generally Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption,
Prejudice and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23 (disagreeing with
Professor Spiro and arguing that preemption of state involvement in immigration enforcement
is not an abrogation of state rights).
86. See INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
87. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 to -564
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)).
88. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Partners, http://www.ice.gov/partners/
287g/Section287_g.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010); see also Senate Judiciary Committee Holds
Hearing on Oversight of DHS, 85 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1209, 1210 (2008) (citing to the
testimony of Secretary Chertoff that there were over forty such agreements in March 2008). The
number of 287(g) agreements actually peaked at seventy-seven, but after Secretary Napolitano
of the Department of Homeland Security announced reforms to the program in July 2009, the
number of participating jurisdictions declined. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
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to ICE accounts, “[t]he program is credited for identifying more than
70,000 (since January 2006) individuals, mostly in jails, who are
89
suspected of being in the country illegally.” In 2006, ICE budgeted
$6,340,000 for training expenditures related to agreements entered
90
into under section 287(g).
These agreements embody the most transparent form of statelocal involvement in immigration enforcement. Memoranda of
agreement govern the scope of the cooperation, and state and/or local
91
officers receive training in immigration law. At their most expansive,
these agreements allow designated state and local officers to act in the
92
same capacity as immigration officers in enforcing immigration law.
Under section 287, state and local agents are empowered to act “in
relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of
93
[noncitizens] in the United States.”
The powers of state and local agents to enforce immigration laws
vary depending on the scope and content of the agreement in force.
The most common form of 287(g) agreement is also the most limited.
This kind of agreement exists between ICE and state or county prison
94
and jail officials, or “Jail Enforcement Officers” (JEOs). ICE trains
these JEOs to make determinations of the immigration status of
inmates in state and county prisons and jails, and to report

Secretary Napolitano Announces New Agreements for State and Local Immigration
Enforcement Partnerships & Adds 11 New Agreements (July 10, 2009), available at http:/www.
dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1247246453625.shtm.
89. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88. This number is significantly
larger than the one provided to the Senate Judiciary Committee by DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff in March 2008, when he told the committee that more than 28,000 unauthorized
migrants had been identified for potential removal through joint efforts under section 287(g) as
of the spring of 2008. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Oversight of DHS, supra
note 88, at 1210.
90. Letter from Reba A. McGiniss, Chief, Information Disclosure Unit, U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enforcement, to Professor Michael Wishnie (Jan. 17, 2008) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
91. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88.
92. These are the agreements designated as “Task Force Officers” agreements by ICE. Id.;
see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND
LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 8 (2009), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d09109.pdf.
93. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006).
94. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88; see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 8 (describing the “jail model” of state and local
participation).
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95

immigration violators to ICE. Agreements of this type exist in
various cities and counties in Arkansas, Arizona, California, Florida,
Georgia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, New
96
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
Other MOAs between ICE and local law enforcement are much
broader and allow local law enforcement officers, after a specified
training period, to enforce immigration laws directly, with the full
immigration authority granted to ICE in the Immigration and
97
Nationality Act. There are some limitations on the officers wielding
98
this power. Only officers who have received training are eligible to
99
perform immigration enforcement duties, and those officers are
subject to ICE supervision during the course of their performance of
100
immigration enforcement duties. Generally, ICE requires that
101
immigration arrests be reported to ICE within twenty-four hours. In
return, state and local officials are ensured federal immunity when
performing immigration enforcement duties pursuant to the terms of
102
the agreement.
103
In spite of significant criticisms of the 287(g) program, on July
10, 2009, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano announced that her
department planned to expand the 287(g) program, adding eleven
new law enforcement agencies to the list of signatories of 287(g)
104
agreements. In response to the program’s many critics, however,
DHS revised the MOAs to clarify the scope of immigration
enforcement powers granted by the agreements and provided
105
additional guidelines for ICE supervision of the program. To
combat the concern that 287(g) agreements were serving as the basis
for pretextual (and illegitimate) criminal arrests as a means of

95. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and
the State of Ala. (Sept. 10, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Some participating
agencies are designated as both JEOs and TFOs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 92, at 8.
98. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 7–8.
99. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. and
the State of Ala., supra note 97, at 2, 5.
100. Id. at 5.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 6.
103. See infra notes 278–84 and accompanying text.
104. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 88.
105. Id.
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initiating removal proceedings, the revised MOAs clarified the fact
that law enforcement agencies are required to pursue all criminal
106
charges that originally caused the offender to be taken into custody.
The revised MOAs also prioritize the enforcement efforts on which
participating law enforcement agencies ought to focus, noting that the
first priority ought to be noncitizens arrested for major drug offenses
107
or violent crimes.
A number of civil rights organizations have concluded that the
minor revisions to the program are unlikely to address racial-profiling
concerns, and have also expressed a concern over the fact that the
new MOAs specify that documents generated pursuant to these
108
agreements “shall not be considered public records.”
Demonstrating the complete lack of middle ground in the
immigration debate, certain civil rights organizations criticize the
Obama administration’s reforms as completely ineffectual, while
organizations that favor strict enforcement argue that these same
109
revisions essentially gut the agreements.
If 287(g) agreements raise concerns, they also have certain
virtues. First, in spite of restrictions on public access, they are
transparent relative to other forms of cooperation, insofar as the
technical terms of cooperation are reduced to a written document.
110
ICE publicizes a list of existing agreements, and the public can
obtain the agreements themselves. Second, the agreements contain

106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Sherry Greenfield, Federal Authorities Announce Changes to Controversial
287g Program, GAZETTE.NET, July 21, 2009, http://www.gazette.net/stories/07212009/frednew
74048_32538.shtml (outlining local law enforcement’s understanding of 287(g) priorities). For a
hyperlink to a side-by-side comparison of a typical MOA before and after the changes, see id.
108. Daphne Eviatar, Immigration Program Expands, Despite Abuse Record: Many of
Arpaio’s Tactics Sanctioned by Federally Granted Authority, WASH. INDEP., July 23, 2009,
http://washingtonindependent.com/52197/immigration-program-expands-despite-abuse-record;
see also Daphne Eviatar, New DHS Rules Disappoint Immigrants’ Advocates, WASH. INDEP.,
July 17, 2009 http://washingtonindependent.com/51662/new-dhs-rules-disappoint-immigrantsadvocates (noting the dissatisfaction of the National Immigration Law Center, the Detention
Watch Network, and the ACLU, and reporting that “a group of 25 civil rights and community
groups issued a statement denouncing” the expansion of the program).
109. See, e.g., JENA BAKER MCNEILL & MATT A. MAYER, SECTION 287(G) REVISIONS:
TEARING DOWN STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ONE CHANGE AT A TIME
(2009), www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/wm2543.cfm (writing that by requiring
law enforcement to process noncitizens for crime, the revisions “gut the force-multiplier
purpose of 287(g)”).
110. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 88.
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111

complaint procedures for reporting abuses, and DHS now has its
112
own published procedure for complaints. Moreover, when the
federal government has concerns about a particular law enforcement
agency, the government can decline to enter into an agreement with
113
that agency, or can even cancel an existing one. Finally, the
agreements are limited in scope. Only trained law enforcement
officials participate in immigration enforcement, and their powers are
limited by written agreement. There is no doubt that 287(g) authority
can be, and has been, subject to abuses and has suffered from
insufficient federal oversight. Nevertheless, the agreements, entered
into pursuant to a statutory provision, are constrained to a certain
degree by law. As will be discussed below, not all enforcement
cooperation is similarly constrained, and this raises an even more
difficult set of problems than the 287(g) program.
B. ICE ACCESS and State and Local Law Enforcement
Although 287(g) programs have been the subject of a good deal
of critical attention, they are a tiny part of the overall system of state
and local participation in enforcement that has evolved over the past
decade. Indeed, in recent months, ICE has organized a number of
ongoing cooperative operations under the umbrella of its ACCESS
114
program.
Examples of ACCESS programs include the Law Enforcement
Support Center (LESC), “Fugitive Operations Teams” deployed
throughout the country, “Operation Predator,” and “Operation
111. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Section 287g, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/
factsheets/section287_g.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (noting that each MOA “prescribes the
agreed upon complaint process governing officer conduct during the life of the MOA”). Given
the Government Accountability Office’s concerns regarding the inconsistencies of oversight
generally, it is not clear how effective such procedures have been. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 14–15.
112. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcment, 287(g) Complaint Process, http://www.ice.
gov/pi/news/factsheets/section287_g-complaints.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
113. For a discussion of the cancellation of the Maricopa County contract, see infra notes
280–81 and accompanying text.
114. ACCESS stands for Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and
Security. At the moment, it encompasses fourteen programs, although the umbrella is loose
enough to accommodate frequent changes in enforcement efforts. See U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, Office of State and Local Coordination: Access - Agreements of
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security, http://www.ice.gov/oslc/
iceaccess.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (listing ACCESS programs). This Article does not
address all fourteen programs, but instead focuses on those most directly related to interior
immigration enforcement.
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115

Community Shield.” In each of these efforts, state and local law
enforcement officers have played a role—one that has not been
confined to the four corners of 287(g) agreements. This Section
discusses each of these four programs in turn.
1. From Operation Absconder and NSEERS to LESC. In late
2001, the Department of Justice announced that it would enter into
NCIC the names of foreign nationals who had ignored outstanding
deportation orders—a category of people that they labeled
116
“absconders.” The absconder category is problematic: studies have
shown that as many as two-thirds of the individuals categorized by
ICE as absconders never actually received notice that they were
117
subject to removal. Nevertheless, these names were entered into the
database.
In June 2002, the attorney general expanded this use of NCIC to
include individuals who violated the terms of the National Security
118
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS). NSEERS required
certain noncitizens deemed to be “high risk” to submit to
fingerprinting, photographs, and registration of their location on a
119
periodic basis. Notably, for purposes of the NSEERS program, risk
120
was a function of one’s nationality and religion. Individuals who
violated the terms of the program were entered into the NCIC
121
database.
Since that time, the Justice Department has expanded the NCIC
database to include a host of noncitizens whose only infractions are
122
violations of civil immigration law. Yet because the names are in the
database, police often detain these individuals following routine
encounters. The practice of including civil violators in NCIC has thus

115. Id.
116. HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., BLURRING THE LINES: A PROFILE OF STATE AND
LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW USING THE NATIONAL CRIME
INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE, 2002–2004, at 7 (2005), available at http://www.migration
policy.org/pubs/MPI_report_Blurring_the_Lines_120805.pdf.
117. Id. at 6.
118. Id.
119. Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of
Post-9/11 Policy Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction
Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 609, 630 (2005).
120. See id. (discussing the NSEERS program’s targeting of those originating from Arabian
or Muslim countries, regardless of what passport they held).
121. Wishnie, supra note 84, at 1096.
122. Id. at 1086–87.
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resulted in a de facto (and sometimes unwitting) cooperation of state
and local law enforcement with DHS in enforcing civil immigration
123
laws—a fact that incited criticisms by some local officials.
Regardless of potential criticism, the entry of immigration
violators, including civil violators, into the NCIC has by now become
a routine practice. The NCIC database now contains over 250,000
124
ICE records. Currently, ICE agents train state and local law
enforcement officers to use ICE’s Law Enforcement Support Center,
which provides officers with the ability to inquire about a person’s
125
criminal history and immigration history. Upon a call from a state
or local law enforcement officer, an ICE officer runs the individual’s
identification data through various DHS databases and the NCIC
126
database to ascertain immigration status. Increasingly, localities are
taking advantage of this training so that individuals detained during
routine traffic stops or other minor violations must be cleared
through LESC. Despite concerns about the accuracy of these
databases, the number of calls to the LESC database was over
127
800,000 in the year 2008, up from 4,000 in 1996. From somewhat
narrow beginnings, the practice of entering absconders into the NCIC
database has resulted in what effectively amounts to robust
cooperation between ICE and state and local law enforcement
officers in enforcing not only criminal law, but also civil immigration
law.
2. Fugitive Operations Teams. Another development arising out
of Operation Absconder was ICE’s formation of Fugitive Operations
Teams throughout the country. ICE initiated the National Fugitive
Operations Program on February 25, 2002, within the Office of

123. See, e.g., IMMIGRATION COMM., MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS, M.C.C. IMMIGRATION
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY LOCAL
POLICE AGENCIES 10 (2006), available at http://majorcitieschiefs.org/pdfpublic/mcc_position_
statement_revised_cef.pdf (“The inclusion of civil detainers on the system has created confusion
for local police agencies and subjected them to possible liability for exceeding their authority by
arresting a person upon the basis of a mere civil detainer.”); see also APPLESEED, FORCING
OUR BLUES INTO GRAY AREAS: LOCAL POLICE AND FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
28–29 (2008), available at http://www.neappleseed.org/docs/local_police_and_immigration_
enforcement.pdf (discussing this criticism).
124. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Law Enforcement Support Center,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/lesc.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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Detention and Removal. The stated purpose of these teams is to
“identify, locate, apprehend, process, and remove fugitive aliens from
the United States, with the highest priority placed on those fugitives
129
who have been convicted of crimes.” ICE has grouped its Fugitive
Operations efforts, along with the 287(g) agreements, the LESC
program, and several other programs, under the umbrella of its
130
ACCESS program. The Fugitive Operations program has rapidly
expanded over the past five years. In 2003, at its inception, the
131
132
program consisted of eight teams and a $9 million budget. By
October 2008, there were one hundred teams and a $218 million
133
budget.
Even with a significant increase in staffing, ICE’s Fugitive
Operations Teams still rely on other law enforcement agencies to
help them achieve their stated goals. Indeed, ICE actively solicits
cooperation from state and local law enforcement to participate as
134
liaisons to their Fugitive Operations efforts. These state and local
agents have conducted activities in connection with ICE’s Fugitive
135
Operations program in many different parts of the country. State
and local officials who participate in these operations—unlike those
who enforce immigration laws pursuant to 287(g) agreements—need
not undergo lengthy training. Interviews with various law
enforcement agencies have revealed that participation in this program

128. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, National Fugitive Operations Program,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro/nfop.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
129. ICE ACCESS, supra note 7.
130. Id.
131. Jessica Schau, Amidst Critical Reports, Obama Administration to Review Home Raids
Program, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 251, 252 (2008) (citing Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Remarks on the State of Immigration and the No Match Rule (Oct. 23, 2008),
available at http:// www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1224803933474.shtm).
132. Id. at 252 (citing OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
AN ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S
FUGITIVE OPERATIONS TEAMS 6 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/
OIG_07-34_Mar07.pdf).
133. Id. (citing Chertoff, supra note 131).
134. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 128; see also OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 132, at 24 (describing state and local participation in these efforts).
135. See, e.g., Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, 644 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1185–89, 1203–04 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (describing, inter alia, local police
involvement in immigration enforcement and ruling on civil rights violations by local and
federal officials); Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, Nassau Complains to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at B1 (noting the participation of the Nassau County Police in area ICE
raids and recording a local officer’s dissatisfaction with the way the raid was conducted).
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sometimes requires no training at all. Moreover, unlike 287(g)
programs, Fugitive Operations does not impose a formal reporting or
supervision structure on state and local participants. Presumably, this
is justified on the ground that ICE agents are responsible for actual
arrests and interrogations, whereas state and local officers are limited
to providing information to ICE about suspects and playing a
137
supporting role for ICE during enforcement actions.
The Fugitive Operations Teams’ stated objective of
138
apprehending “fugitives who have been convicted of crimes,”
overlaps with state and local public safety responsibilities, which may
explain the participation of untrained state and local officers in these
efforts. The search for “fugitives,” however, often yields arrests of
many noncitizens who were not the subject of the initial search. When
ICE has an administrative warrant to search for a fugitive, this
warrant is often used to secure entry into homes or other private
139
areas where it is possible to sweep up “collateral catches.” Until

136. Interview with Carolyn Hsu, Pub. Relations Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, in Dallas, Tex. (Sept. 16, 2008) (stating that no additional training is required for
local law enforcement to participate on Fugitive Operations Teams, while noting the limited
role of local police in enforcement actions); Interview with Marshals from the Joint E. Tex.
Fugitive Apprehension Task Force, Sherman, Tex., and the Gulf Coast Violent Offenders Task
Force, S. Dist. of Tex. (Sept. 16, 2008) (same). These interviews have been memorialized in a
document on file with the Duke Law Journal. Indeed, not all federal agent participants received
special training prior to their involvement in these programs. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., supra note 132, at 29–30.
137. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 132, at 26–29. Police engage in
activities such as securing the perimeter of homes during ICE raids. Id. at 27. Presumably, this
implies that they are authorized to use force against civil immigration violators as necessary to
“secure” the area, although there is no available information about whether or how often this
has actually happened. Interestingly, DHS’s Office of the Inspector General report suggests that
the role of state and local law enforcement officers at the scene of enforcement activities is to
“ease[] the[] concerns” of the subjects of the enforcement action who would otherwise be
“afraid of the [immigration] officers in plainclothes,” id. at 27, although it is a bit hard to fathom
how adding armed police officers into the raid equation would do anything other than escalate
the concerns of the targets.
138. Id. at 4.
139. Nina Bernstein, Despite Vow, Target of Immigrant Raids Shifted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2009, at A1; Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Priorities Questioned: Report Says Focus on Deporting
Criminals Apparently Shifted, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2009, at A2; see also CHIU ET AL., supra note
34, at 11 (“[T]he high percentage of collateral arrests is consistent with allegations that ICE
agents are using home raids for purported targets as a pretext to enter homes and illegally seize
mere civil immigration violators . . . . who ICE happens to encounter during home raid
operations.”); MARGOT MENDELSON, SHAYNA STROM & MICHAEL WISHNIE, MIGRATION
POLICY INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS
PROGRAM 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NFOP_Feb09.pdf
(“Despite NFOP’s mandate to arrest dangerous fugitives, almost three-quarters (73 percent) of
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recently, the majority of the people Fugitive Operations Teams
detained had no violent criminal record, and a substantial number
were, in fact, “collateral catches” who did not even have outstanding
140
removal orders against them. This means that state and local law
enforcement officers have assisted in the enforcement of civil
immigration laws through their participation in these Fugitive
Operations Teams.
In a break from the practices of the prior administration,
Secretary Napolitano of DHS ordered a review of the program in
141
early 2009, and near the end of 2009, the Department announced
that the Fugitive Operations Teams were to focus on their intended
142
targets. To promote this goal, ICE required that the teams identify
the number of arrestees who are actually fugitives (as opposed to
collateral catches) and removed the prior administration’s quota
requirements, which had helped to fuel more aggressive operations.
To deal with allegations of constitutional violations by Fugitive
143
Operations Teams, ICE officials mandated Fourth Amendment
144
training for team officers every six months. The overall impact of
the individuals apprehended by FOTs from 2003 through February 2008 had no criminal
conviction.”).
140. See MENDELSON ET AL., supra note 139, at 1–2 (noting that between 2003 and 2008, 73
percent of individuals detained by the Fugitive Operations Teams had no criminal records and
in 2007, 40 percent of detainees were non-fugitive, “collateral catches”); Katherine Evans, The
Ice Storm in U.S. Homes: An Urgent Call for Policy Change, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
561, 574 n.92 (2009) (“Note that of the arrests that do fall within one of the five priority
categories, the vast majority falls within the lowest category—those individuals who have
received an order of deportation but have no criminal history. This category, in addition to the
collateral arrests, accounts for seventy-three percent of the nearly 97,000 arrests by Fugitive
Operations Teams from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2008.”); see also Lee Rood, Register
Exclusive: Many ICE Arrests Are Not of Criminals, Data Show, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 16,
2009, at A1 (noting that in 2009 in a five-state region including Iowa, 42 percent of the arrestees
of the Fugitive Operations Team were actually “non-fugitives” with no outstanding removal
orders against them, and only 36 percent of arrestees actually had criminal convictions).
141. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Issues Immigration
and Border Security Action Directive (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/
releases/pr_1233353528835.shtm. See generally Schau, supra note 131 (discussing the political
and social developments leading up to the issuance of the Immigration and Border Security
Action Directive).
142. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Field Office Directors and Fugitive Operation Team Members, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/partners/opp/final_fug_
ops_priorities12-08-09.pdf.
143. For a discussion of successful suppression motions brought in response to
unconstitutional searches and seizures by ICE Fugitive Operations Teams, see infra note 236.
144. Memorandum from John Morton to Field Office Directors and Fugitive Operation
Team Members, supra note 142.
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the stated policy changes is still unclear, however. Raids on homes
145
have continued under the new administration, and the Fourth
Amendment training that is now required for ICE agents does not
146
extend to state and local participants.
3. Criminal Alien Program. Like the Fugitive Operations Teams,
the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) involves intergovernmental
cooperation aimed at a particular subset of immigration violators.
Whereas the Joint Fugitive Task Forces take aim at individuals with
outstanding orders of removal, CAP focuses on a different subset of
immigration violators: individuals that ICE identifies as criminal
aliens. ICE’s stated goal for CAP is to identify “criminal aliens
incarcerated in federal, state and local prisons and jails throughout
the United States, preventing their release into the general public by
securing a final order of removal prior to the termination of their
147
sentences.” Under CAP, ICE screens local arrestees in detention
148
and issues detainers against removable noncitizens.
In theory, CAP programs should have no impact on the nature of
state and local policing. ICE screens individuals who have already
been arrested to determine their immigration status. The commission
of a criminal offense, therefore, should operate as a necessary
predicate to the ICE screening. In practice, however, participating in
CAP can influence police behavior. Because all arrestees are
screened, not just those convicted, the CAP program covers
individuals who are not actually criminals. To the extent that local
police officers view immigration enforcement as a legitimate law
enforcement priority, they can use their discretion to target for arrest
those whom they believe—whether correctly or incorrectly—to be
unlawfully present. Without proper training, such incentives can lead
some law enforcement officials to engage in racial profiling. Indeed, a

145. See Julia Preston, Firm Stance on Illegal Immigrants Remains Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3, 2009, at A14 (“After early pledges by President Obama that he would moderate the Bush
administration’s tough policy on immigration enforcement, his administration is pursuing an
aggressive strategy for an illegal-immigration crackdown that relies significantly on programs
started by his predecessor.”).
146. See Memorandum from John Morton to Field Office Directors and Fugitive Operation
Team Members, supra note 142 (not specifying training or guidelines for state and local law
enforcement officers).
147. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Criminal Alien Program, http://www.ice.
gov/pi/news/factsheets/criminal_alien_program.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
148. Id.
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recent study of one CAP program in Irving, Texas, concluded that
149
this is exactly what was happening in that town.
The discretion allowed to state and local law enforcement has
increased over the life of CAP. The Obama administration has
announced plans to expand CAP with a new initiative called “Secure
Communities” that is also premised on intergovernmental
150
cooperation to target immigration offenders with criminal records.
4. Operation Community Shield and Operation Predator.
Operation Community Shield provides another example of a program
of state-local cooperation with ICE that falls under the umbrella of
ICE’s ACCESS programs. The stated goal of Operation Community
Shield is to target criminal street gang members and their associates
151
for deportation. This is not primarily an immigration enforcement
152
goal, but rather a criminal law enforcement goal. The program is
designed to promote coordination between state and local law
enforcement officers and ICE in efforts to decrease gang-related
crime and remove noncitizens who are involved in criminal gang
153
activity. The implementation of Operation Community Shield has
been less clear-cut than the stated goals, however.
One of the biggest ambiguities about the operation is that it
provides no legal definitions for “criminal street gangs” or
154
“associates,” the targets of the operation. Identification of the
155
targets thus often falls to state and local law enforcement. Once
these agents identify an individual as a gang member and arrest him,
ICE can initiate removal proceedings against that individual and any
arrested associates on the basis of their violation of immigration
156
law. The lack of legal standards governing the identification of gang

149. TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN
ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf.
150. Rood, supra note 140. For additional discussion of the Secure Communities initiative,
see infra Part II.C.
151. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Operation Community Shield: Targeting
Violent Transnational Street Gangs, http://www.ice.gov/pi/investigations/comshield/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
152. Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield? Examining the Removal of the
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 321–24.
153. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 151.
154. Chacón, supra note 152, at 330–33.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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members creates a risk of increased racial profiling in law
157
enforcement. At a minimum, it ensures that state and local law
enforcement can be responsible for leading efforts to enforce civil
immigration laws against identified gang members and the associates
of gang members, even though some of these individuals have no
criminal record, and, in the case of associates, perhaps no actual gang
158
affiliation.
Operation Predator takes aim at one of the most reviled
159
categories of criminals: sex offenders. Generally, the targets of
Operation Predator are identified through the use of the FBI’s NCIC
160
database of sex offenders from all fifty states. ICE can determine
which of these individuals may be subject to removal, and can target
161
those individuals for apprehension. Because the sex offender
database includes not only serious sex offenders, but also individuals
who have committed relatively minor offenses and individuals who
clearly pose no risk to the greater community, however, Operation
Predator can result in the targeting of individuals whose
circumstances do not seem to align with DHS’s and ICE’s stated goal
162
of “protecting children.”

157. Id. at 337–44.
158. Questions have also been raised regarding the efficacy of using removal as an antigang
strategy. There is no doubt that the policy is tremendously burdensome for receiving countries.
Id. at 349–50; see also GEOFF THALE & ELSA FALKENBURGER, YOUTH GANGS IN CENTRAL
AMERICA: ISSUES IN HUMAN RIGHTS, EFFECTIVE POLICING AND PREVENTION, A
WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA SPECIAL REPORT 1–2 (2006), available at
http://www.wola.org/gangs/gangs_report_final_nov_06.pdf. Moreover, there is some evidence
suggesting that U.S. removal policy has actually strengthened the transnational ties of gang
members and has fueled rather than diminished the gang problem. See, e.g., Rocky Delgadillo,
Going Global to Fight Gangs, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2008, at A15 (noting that “[t]he two fastestgrowing and most powerful gangs in the world are home grown products of Los Angeles,” and
explaining how past U.S. deportation policy helped make them into powerful transnational
criminal elements); Matthew Quirk, How to Grow a Gang, ATLANTIC, May 2008,
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200805/world-in-numbers (“For hard-core gang members,
quickie deportations on immigration charges are often no more than short-term fixes; lengthy
American prison sentences would be more effective.”).
159. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Operation Predator (July 9,
2003),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0210.shtm;
U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Fact Sheet - Operation Predator,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/070607operationpredator.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
160. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 159.
161. Id.
162. See Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Terrorism as a War on
Immigrant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 573 (2004) (“Even
though the sex offenders have been styled as ‘the worst of the worst,’ as a consequence of their
convictions for a sex offense, many of them were not sentenced to prison but rather to
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Operation Predator also includes efforts to identify and assist
children worldwide who are subject to exploitation by the child
pornography industry; DHS makes the understandable claim that the
163
initiative “protect[s] children worldwide.” But there is also a certain
irony to this claim, given that the removal of persons identified as
“sexual predators” does not seem like the best way to protect
children in receiving countries.
C. Secure Communities Initiative
Another formal program involving state and local participation
in immigration enforcement—one that is not grouped under the ICE
ACCESS rubric—is the Secure Communities initiative. In December
2007, President Bush signed into law the fiscal year 2008
appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security, which
included funds for the beginning of the Secure Communities Program
164
Management Office. By March 2008, DHS had submitted to
Congress a report on the program entitled Secure Communities: A
165
Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens. The
program initially focused on removable noncitizens in prisons and
jails. State and local officials were charged with identifying removable
individuals in their prisons and jails by running fingerprint data not
only against the FBI’s criminal databases but also against DHS’s
databases, which include information on immigration violations. DHS
soon was directed by Congress to expand the program to include all

probation, presumably an indicator of the lesser seriousness of their offense. Those sentenced to
prison are often moved directly from prison to immigration custody. This explains why most of
those caught through Operation Predator either had relatively old convictions or had not been
sentenced to imprisonment.”) For example, Operation Predator targeted a 25-year-old Mexican
national due to a statutory rape charge “that stemmed from his relationship with a 14-year-old
girlfriend that began when he was 17 and in high school.” Frank James, Immigrant Sex
Offenders Targeted, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2005, at 1. He was convicted, served his time in prison,
and fulfilled his probation requirements, but was still targeted by Operation Predator. Id.
163. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 159.
164. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities, http://www.ice.gov/
secure_communities/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010); see also U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove
Criminal Aliens, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/secure_communities.htm (last visited
Mar. 28, 2010) (describing the general mission of the Secure Communities initiative).
165. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Unveils Sweeping New
Plan
to
Target
Criminal
Aliens
in
Jails
Nationwide
(Mar.
28,
2008),
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/ 080414washington.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2010).
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166

“deportable criminal aliens.” ICE describes the program as a “risk
based approach” that “prioritiz[es] the removal of the most
167
dangerous criminals.” In its current form, however, the program
results in screening of arrestees in participating jurisdictions without
regard for the reason for the arrest or whether the person is guilty or
168
innocent of a crime. In this sense, ICE’s characterization of this
program as focused exclusively on criminal aliens is somewhat
misleading.
The precise contours of the program are difficult to assess
because the agencies responsible have promulgated no regulations
169
governing the Secure Communities program. What is clear, though,
is that the program affects a significant number of people. By
November 2009, ninety-five cities and counties in eleven states were
170
participating in the program. In the first half of 2009, over 266,000
fingerprints were run through the system, resulting in 32,000
171
matches. Not all of those individuals are necessarily removable—as
critics point out, the net sweeps a bit widely. For example, lawful
permanent residents who commit many types of misdemeanors are
172
not removable, but they would come up as matches in this system.
Similarly, individuals who have been erroneously arrested but are in
the DHS database would also come up as a match. The width of the
Secure Community net has prompted many critics to argue that the
program is simply not adequately tailored to achieve its purported
objective of focusing resources on noncitizens who actually pose a
173
threat to society. Officials defending the program emphasize the

166. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for 2010: Priorities Enforcing
Immigration Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. of the H. Appropriations
Comm., 111th Cong. 946 (2009) (statement of David Venturella, Executive Director, Secure
Communities, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
167. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
SECURE COMMUNITIES FACT SHEET (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/
factsheets/secure_communities.pdf.
168. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS ABOUT THE
SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/
LocalLaw/secure-communities-2009-03-23.pdf.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Editorial, Immigrants, Criminalized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A38.
171. Susan Carroll, ICE Program Is Casting a Wide Net, HOUSTON CHRON., July 13, 2009, at
A1
172. Id. On the other hand, the system also misses individuals who entered without
inspection and are therefore not included in DHS’s records. Id.
173. Id.; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 168, at 3 (citing studies finding
that ICE “has done a bad job of focusing enforcement on the ‘worst of the worst,’” and that the
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fact that even when there are matches, ICE can ultimately exercise
174
discretion in deciding whom to remove.
ICE plans a significant, rapid expansion of the program. By 2012,
the program will be running in all of the nation’s prisons and 3,100 of
175
its local jails. It is possible that the Secure Community agreements
will obviate the need for those 287(g) agreements that focus solely on
176
immigration enforcement in prisons and jails.
***
Federal-state-local cooperation in immigration enforcement runs
the gamut from ICE’s formal training of state and local officers in the
enforcement of immigration laws to screening of noncitizens in local
jails to state and local law enforcement participation in ICE arrests of
purported street gang members or sexual predators. This summary of
cooperation does not even take into account the more informal
coordination between ICE and local agents in enforcement actions
177
such as workplace and home raids and other law enforcement
178
efforts in jurisdictions across the country.
“programs largely target those accused of immigration status violations and traffic offenses”);
Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, ICE to Expand New Immigration Enforcement Program in
Local Jails, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, June 15, 2009, http://www.migrationin
formation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=732 (noting that the ICE guidelines fail to prioritize
removal of those offenders who pose the greatest risks of harm to society).
174. Carroll, supra note 171.
175. Chishti & Bergeron, supra note 173.
176. Id.
177. Worksite enforcement was relatively lax in the twenty-year period that followed the
prohibition on hiring unauthorized noncitizens. See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the
Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193,
209–11 (noting that enforcement declined throughout the 1990s and explaining reasons for the
decline). Over the past few years, as the staffing and budget of ICE has grown, the Department
of Homeland Security has increased the focus on worksite enforcement. See Impacts of Border
Security and Immigration on Ways and Means Programs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 109th Cong. 12 (2006) (statement of Julie L. Myers, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement) (noting that worksite enforcement is now a “top priority” for the
Department and the administration); Michael Chertoff, Myth vs. Fact: Worksite Enforcement,
U.S. DEPARTMENT HOMELAND SECURITY LEADERSHIP J., July 9, 2008, http://www.dhs.
gov/journal/leadership/2008/07/myth-vs-fact-worksite-enforcement.html (noting the increasing
numbers of worksite raids and arrests since 2004). ICE maintains that coordination with state
and local law enforcement is a central component of its worksite enforcement strategy. See
Chertoff, supra (“When ICE conducts an enforcement action, it coordinates with state and local
law enforcement and those responsible for public safety in a manner that will not compromise
the operation.”). State and local officials are credited with participation in a number of such
raids in dozens of jurisdictions over the past year. See, e.g., ICE Conducts Raids on Pilgrim’s
Pride Plants in Five States; Arrests 311 Foreign Nationals, 85 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1292,
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Despite broad scholarly claims concerning the effect of local
participation on immigration enforcement, it should be evident from
the foregoing discussion that the forms of cooperation are many and
various. Different modes of cooperation raise different kinds of risks.
In recent months, a growing number of scholars and commentators
have focused on the pitfalls of intergovernmental cooperation
179
pursuant to 287(g) agreements. But as the foregoing discussion
illustrates, a great deal more intergovernmental cooperation is also
taking place through the use of shared databases and both formal and
ad hoc state and local law enforcement participation in ICE
enforcement actions. All modes of cooperation that directly engage
state and local officers in civil immigration enforcement—whether
through 287(g) agreements, CAP, the anticrime operations discussed
previously, or the new and expanding Secure Communities
initiative—can fundamentally alter the procedural baselines
governing the conduct of state and local law enforcement.
III. THE PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF A DECENTRALIZED,
CRIME-CONTROL APPROACH TO MIGRATION
The decision by officials at all levels of government to more
actively enforce immigration law in the interior of the country is
having a transformative effect on the nature of law enforcement in
many parts of the United States. As previously noted, there has been
an exponential expansion in the resources expended by the United
180
States government on interior enforcement. If the noncitizen
population against whom these measures are aimed were relatively
small, such measures would be unlikely to have a widespread impact
on national law enforcement. But the absolute numbers of
noncitizens living and working within the United States, and
therefore potentially subject to removal for violation of the
immigration laws, is substantial and growing. According to census
figures, there are now 38 million non–native born persons living in the
1292 (2008) (noting that investigations were a product of multi-agency, state-federal
cooperation and that ninety-one of those individuals faced criminal charges for identity theft
and fraud).
178. Such cooperation has also occurred in antismuggling and antitrafficking enforcement
efforts. See, e.g., Noteworthy: ICE Arrests More than 600 Illegal Aliens in Phoenix, 85
INTERPRETER RELEASES 883, 883–84 (2008); Noteworthy: More than 300 Immigrants and
Suspected Smugglers Arrested in Mississippi, 85 INTERPRETER RELEASES 278, 278 (2008).
179. See infra notes 278–84.
180. See supra Part I.A.
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181

United States. Of those, more than 22 million are not naturalized
182
citizens and remain subject to removal. According to the Pew
Hispanic Center, this number includes about 11.5 to 12 million
183
unauthorized migrants.
Moreover, it is important to stress that immigration enforcement
does not affect only noncitizens. Increasingly, immigrants live in
mixed-status families that include lawful immigrants and
184
unauthorized migrants as well as citizens. Because noncitizens and
citizens share homes and neighborhoods, citizens and noncitizens who
are lawfully present are subjected to enforcement actions as a
collateral consequence of internal immigration enforcement measures
taken against removable noncitizens. Citizens and lawfully present
noncitizens already have been subject to immigration enforcement
actions, including prolonged stops, searches, interrogations, arrest,
185
detention, and (in rare cases) even removal.

181. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases 2008 American
Community Survey Data (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/
www/releases/archives/american_community_survey_acs/014237.html.
182. Id. Indeed, changes in the law over the past two decades have rendered lawful
permanent residents much more vulnerable to removal than in the past. See, e.g., HING, supra
note 59, at 70–87 (2006) (discussing the removal of lawful permanent residents after the 1996
elimination of INA § 212(c) relief); KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 227–28 (discussing the
increasing legal vulnerability of LPRs); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE
LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006) (describing
the shift and advocating a return to treating lawful permanent residents as “citizens in waiting”);
Morawetz, supra note 59, at 1953–54 (providing examples of lawful permanent residents
removed despite substantial family ties). See generally Morawetz, supra note 60, 180–92
(discussing the harsh immigration consequences for drug crimes committed by lawful
permanent residents).
183. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 2 (2006), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
184. MICHAEL FIX, WENDY ZIMMERMAN & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE INTEGRATION OF
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2001) (noting that one in every ten children
in the United States lives in a family in which at least one family member is undocumented); see
also Molly Hazel Sutter, Note, Mixed-Status Families and Broken Homes: The Clash Between
the U.S. Hardship Standard in Cancellation of Removal Proceedings and International Law, 15
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 783, 806–08 (2006) (discussing the heavy restrictions on
relief from removal for the undocumented relatives of U.S. citizens). See generally David B.
Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165
(2006) (discussing the plight of these mixed-status families).
185. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF 4TH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 13–41 (reporting on protracted detention and interrogation of U.S.
citizens in several workplace raids); Nina Bernstein, Citizens Caught Up in Immigration Raid,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at B5; Kristin Collins, N.C. Native Wrongly Deported to Mexico,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 30, 2009, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/local/story/
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Given the growth in interior enforcement, and the increasing
number of people—both citizens and noncitizens—whose lives are
affected by this enforcement, it is worth asking whether the
transformation in the enforcement landscape is also transforming the
nature of individual rights and procedural protections.
There is precedent for asking this question. As the “war on
drugs” expanded in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars increasingly
considered the question of whether enforcement actions undertaken
as part of the drug war were impacting criminal procedural
protections. Most (even those who supported the transformation)
186
answered the question in the affirmative.
“The warrant
requirement, the need for particularized suspicion before stopping
individuals on the highway, and the requirement that police knock
and announce themselves before entering a private home, have all
187
been proposed recently as necessary casualties of the war on drugs.”
Numerous cases handed down by the Supreme Court in the 1980s and
1990s invoked the needs of the drug war to justify the circumscription
of the rights of citizens subject to governmental investigation. During
this time, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of government
188
searches permissible without a warrant, greatly increased the scope
917007.html (discussing ICE’s removal of an American citizen); Jacqueline Stevens, Deporting
American Citizens: ICE’s Mexican-izing of Mark Lyttle, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 21, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacqueline-stevens-phd/deporting-american-citize_b_265187.
html (“A systematic examination of thousands of individual case files for detainees in southern
Arizona between 2006 and 2008 revealed that just over one percent were deemed U.S. citizens
by an immigration judge. Almost all were held for more than two months.”); Jacqueline
Stevens, Thin ICE, NATION, June 23, 2008, at 20, 20; Stephanie Francis Ward, Illegal Aliens on
I.C.E., A.B.A. J., June 1, 2008, at 44, 47 (noting several incidents involving the wrongful
deportation of U.S. citizens, many of whom had cognitive disabilities).
186. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 755–56 (2002);
Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot Soldier”: Can the Fourth Amendment Survive the Supreme
Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 631, 649 (2004); Omar Saleem, The Age of
Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry
“Stop and Frisk,” 50 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 471–75 (1997); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After
the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2160 (2002) (“Like the war on drugs before it, the war on
terrorism is likely to leave us with a different law of criminal procedure than we had before.”);
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 938–41
(1991). See generally David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271 (describing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
its application to drug cases).
187. Margaret Raymond, Commentary on “The Drug War,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
447, 448–49 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
188. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–37 (1991) (finding “consensual,” and
therefore exempt from the warrant requirement, police officers’ searches of a passenger’s bags
on a bus detained by police); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572–76 (1991) (upholding the
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of stops and searches permissible without probable cause or even
190
191
reasonable suspicion, watered down the “reasonable suspicion”
192
and “probable cause” standards,
and lowered procedural
193
protections at the border and at airport customs.
A byproduct of the loosening of checks on police investigations
was that the nature of policing, particularly in low-income minority
194
neighborhoods, was transformed. Police had freer rein to stop,
aggressively question, search, and detain individuals in such
neighborhoods. This—along with disparate sentencing regimes—
warrantless search of a container within a car during which there was probable cause to search
only the container); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186–89 (1990) (upholding a warrantless
entry based upon the consent of a third party when police incorrectly but “reasonably” believed
that the third party possessed common authority over the premises); California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1988) (holding that a warrantless search of garbage bags for items indicative
of narcotics use did not violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–25 (1984) (establishing a “good faith” exception to the
exclusionary rule for warrants issued on less than probable cause); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 705–07 (1983) (upholding the use of drug-detecting dogs to conduct a sniff
examination of luggage without probable cause); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–85
(1983) (approving the use of transmitters or beepers to conduct surveillance of suspects); United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823–24 (1982) (approving a warrantless search of closed containers
inside an automobile, if officers have probable cause to search the vehicle).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542–44 (1985)
(allowing the sixteen-hour detention on the basis of reasonable suspicion at an international
airport); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 686–88 (1985) (allowing a protracted
roadside stop on the basis of “reasonable suspicion” alone); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
330–33 (1985) (allowing a full search of a student’s purse on reasonable suspicion that she had
violated school rules); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–51 (1983) (allowing a brief
“protective” search of a car on the basis of reasonable suspicion).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004) (finding that no
reasonable suspicion was needed to detain a driver and vehicle and disassemble the gas tank of
the vehicle at the international border); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002) (holding
that no individualized suspicion was necessary to conduct drug tests on students engaged in
extracurricular activities); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–55 (1990)
(requiring no individualized suspicion for stops at DUI checkpoints); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 547, 566–67 (1976) (finding that no individualized suspicion was necessary
for referral to a secondary inspection at a border checkpoint); cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 408 (2005) (finding that the use of a drug-detecting dog did not constitute a “search”
requiring individualized suspicion).
191. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–26 (2000) (finding that flight from officers in a
high-crime area generated the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop).
192. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237–38 (1983) (adopting a “totality of the circumstances”
test for determining whether an informant’s tip is reliable for purposes of a search warrant).
193. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155–56; Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542–
44; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 566–67.
194. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 342–
54 (1998) (describing racial targeting of minority motorists for stops and searches); Saleem,
supra note 186, at 453–60 (describing the modern dilution of criminal procedural protections).
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helped to fuel the rising tide of minority youth imprisoned in
195
America’s prisons and jails. More than one in every hundred adults
196
in the United States is in prison or jail. African Americans are
substantially overrepresented in this substantial number. One in nine
African-American males between the ages of twenty and thirty-four
197
is behind bars. Post–Civil Rights era race relations have largely
been cast in the language of the war on crime, which, in turn, has
resulted in a continued pattern of racial discrimination, segregation,
198
and disenfranchisement. “[T]he war on crime transformed the social
meaning of race in ways that make it more difficult than ever to
resolve America’s constitutive flaw, its legacy of slavery and racial
domination and the structural deformation of democracy that these
199
legacies produced.”
The new focus on immigration enforcement—which appears to
be the most recent iteration of the war on crime—deserves the same
200
sort of analysis. The new criminal justice focus on migration is likely
to encourage continued erosion of criminal procedural protections in
ways that will be felt most keenly by racial minorities—in this case,
Mexican Americans and other Latinos that are associated in the
201
public mind with unauthorized migrants.
195. See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 202–05 (2d ed. 2006); BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 35–51(2006).
196. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 3 (2008),
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_
2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf.
197. Id.
198. See Loic Wacquant, The Place of the Prison in the New Government of Poverty, in
AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME 23, 23–25, 27–28 (Mary Louise Frampton, Ian Haney López &
Jonathan Simon eds., 2008).
199. Jonathan Simon, Ian Haney López & Mary Louise Frampton, Introduction to AFTER
THE WAR ON CRIME, supra note 198, at 3.
200. In theorizing the parallels, Ian Haney-López has posited that both the war on crime
that gave rise to mass incarceration and the current criminalization of immigration can be seen
as different forms of “governing through the fear of minority crime.” See Ian F. Haney-López,
Post-Racial Racism: Policing Race in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 109, 113), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418212 (“[R]acialized mass
incarceration finds its origins . . . in racial politics. . . . [but] [o]nce institutionalized and available
as a form of social ordering, crime control and the carceral state more generally achieved evergreater autonomy from race, and indeed from traditional areas of criminal justice.” (footnotes
omitted)).
201. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 58 (2004) (“Europeans and Canadians tended to be disassociated from the
real and imagined category of illegal alien, which facilitated their national and racial
assimilation as white American citizens. In contrast, Mexicans emerged as the iconic illegal
aliens. Illegal status became constitutive of a racialized Mexican identity and of Mexicans’
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This Part explores the procedural implications of the expanded
and decentered use of criminal law enforcement to achieve migration
control, with attention to the particular structures of cooperation that
are currently in play. Part III.A analyzes the gap between a
noncitizen’s rights in criminal proceedings and those in civil removal
proceedings. Part III.B analyzes the gap in remedies for
governmental misconduct in civil immigration proceedings that was
created by the Supreme Court’s 1984 Lopez-Mendoza decision. Part
III.C discusses the implications of these rights and remedies gaps in a
world where local-state-federal collaboration in immigration
enforcement has become the norm. Part III.D highlights some
troubling trends in criminal jurisprudence that suggest that the rights
gap experienced by noncitizens may be migrating from the civil into
the criminal context. Part III.E concludes with some thoughts about
the significance of these trends.
A. The Rights Gap: Differential Procedural Protections in Civil
Removal Proceedings
The federal Constitution provides certain procedural protections
for individuals subject to criminal investigation, prosecution, and
punishment. These protections include the Fourth Amendment
202
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and right to due
exclusion from the national community and polity.”). Modern policing practices evince
exclusionary policing practices aimed at Latinos. See, e.g., Rights Working Group, ACLU, The
Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States 42 (2009), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf (“In April 2008, in the most
controversial of the neighborhood sweeps, Sheriff Arpaio saturated a small town of
approximately 6,000 Yaqui Indians and Latinos outside of Phoenix with more than one hundred
deputies, a volunteer posse, and a helicopter for two days, stopping residents and chasing them
into their homes. In the end, nine undocumented immigrants were arrested. The community was
so scarred by the event that families are still terrified to leave their homes when they see the
Sheriff’s patrol cars.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 43 (noting “roadblocks and
concentrations of police outside Latino-owned businesses and churches and predominately
Latino areas” of Arkansas); id. at 48 (noting “serious allegations of racial profiling in [three
Georgia] counties, especially in the context of traffic stops”); BORDER ACTION NETWORK,
JUSTICE ON THE LINE: THE UNEQUAL IMPACTS OF BORDER PATROL ACTIVITIES IN ARIZONA
BORDER COMMUNITIES 3 (2004), http://www.borderaction.org/ PDFs/justice_on_the_line.pdf
(noting that DHS agents routinely stop many Latinos and question them about their citizenship,
causing them to feel like outsiders in their communities).
202. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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process, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Eighth
205
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
These protections apply to citizens and noncitizens alike in criminal
206
proceedings. These particular protections exist not only as against
the federal government, but also against state actors by virtue of the
207
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. States also are
able to set heightened standards of criminal procedural protection
through their constitutions, statutes, and regulations, and some
208
have.
Because state action is involved in the enforcement of
immigration law—even civil immigration law—constitutional
protections apply. But the protections available in civil proceedings
have been differentiated from those protections available in criminal
proceedings. The Supreme Court long ago decided that deportation
209
was a civil remedy, not a criminal punishment. Thus, although the
Constitution’s provisions apply to state officials enforcing
immigration law, the scope of applicable rights and the remedies for
violations of constitutional rights is much different in the civil
immigration context than in the criminal context.
With regard to rights, the Fourth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures apply, but by operation of
statute and case law, those protections are narrower in the

203. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The right against self-incrimination is triggered upon arrest or “custodial
interrogation.” See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
204. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This requires the government
to provide counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344–45 (1963).
205. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
206. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1896) (finding noncitizens
in criminal proceedings entitled to full constitutional criminal procedural protections and
distinguishing the situation of noncitizens in removal proceedings).
207. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATIONS 14
(2d ed. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes
applicable to the states the various Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment provisions that apply to
criminal investigation practices.”).
208. Id.
209. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 236 (“The order of deportation is not a punishment for
crime.”); KANSTROOM, supra note 36, at 122 (noting that Wong Wing was central to the genesis
of a dichotomy between civil and criminal proceedings).

CHACON IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

4/28/2010 5:12:36 PM

A DIVERSION OF ATTENTION?

1605
210

immigration enforcement context than in the criminal context. The
Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination do not apply
211
in civil proceedings, and federal regulations only call for officers to
offer a portion of the basic requirement of the Miranda decision when
212
conducting criminal arrests, with no comparable requirement for
civil arrests. Limitations on extremely coercive interrogations apply in
civil proceedings by virtue of the operation of the Due Process
213
Clause, but these violations are much more difficult to establish
than violations of the right against self-incrimination under
214
Miranda.
There is no constitutional right to counsel at the
215
although
government’s expense in civil removal proceedings,
noncitizens do have a statutory right to supply counsel at their own
216
expense. The Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual
210. See discussion infra notes 228–35, 243–65 and accompanying text.
211. The right is limited to the criminally accused. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Thus, the
constitutional requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), whereby an individual
subject to a custodial interrogation must be advised of her right to silence and to counsel—at the
government expense if necessary—do not apply in the civil context.
212. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(v) (2009) (requiring that at the time of arrest, an “arresting
officer shall advise the person of the appropriate rights as required by law at the time of the
arrest, or as soon thereafter as practicable”). Of course, not every situation involving a
“custodial interrogation” that triggers Miranda need be preceded by an official arrest. See, e.g.,
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (explaining that “custody” for purposes of
Miranda involves situations in which a reasonable person in the suspect’s position believes that
he has been constrained in a manner akin to a formal arrest). Thus, it is not clear that this
regulation fully captures the requirements of Miranda.
213. Compare Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766–67 (2003) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment’s self-incrimination provisions attach only when there is a “‘criminal case’ [which]
at the very least requires the initiation of legal proceedings”), with Bong Youn Choy v. Barber,
279 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1960) (suppressing a coerced confession in a deportation proceeding
on due process grounds).
214. Establishing a due process violation generally requires a defendant to establish that
some form of government coercion came into play in bringing about the confession. Sleep
deprivation, physical abuse, and certain forms of official threats can meet the test, but a
defendant must demonstrate that the governmental conduct amounted to some form of
impermissible coercion. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (holding that
physical torture constituted a due process violation). In contrast, a Miranda violation is
established when an interrogating officer fails to offer the requisite warnings or respect an
individual’s right to remain silent and right to counsel when those rights have been invoked. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.
215. See Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (holding that proceedings to enforce
immigration regulations do not involve Sixth Amendment protections).
216. The statutory right is provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act at section 292.
8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in any
appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal proceedings, the
person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.”).
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punishment” does not apply because “deportation is not a
217
punishment for crime.”
Congress, in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), set
forth the standards that are applicable in the investigation and
prosecution of civil immigration violations. Section 287 of the INA
establishes standards for seizures, searches, and custodial
interrogations, and there are subtle differences that arise between the
immigration enforcement context and general criminal investigations
in each of these areas.
First, the INA addresses standards for brief investigative stops.
INA section 287 gives any authorized officer or employee of DHS the
general power, without a warrant, to briefly interrogate noncitizens
218
about their immigration status. The INA makes no distinction in
this regard between internal immigration enforcement and
enforcement at points of entry. The statute indicates that an agent can
interrogate any person he “believes” to be an alien within the
219
meaning of the act. In other words, the statute allows for brief
detentions and interrogation as to status without probable cause,
upon reasonable suspicion that the individual is committing an
immigration violation. Because it allows interrogation of noncitizens
upon reasonable suspicion of a civil violation, this authority is slightly
broader than the parameters of a stop justified by reasonable
suspicion under Fourth Amendment law as it has developed in the
criminal context, in which such stops are (technically) limited to cases
in which there is reasonable suspicion of a crime or a threat to officer
220
safety. In immigration enforcement, reasonable suspicion of a civil
violation is sufficient to justify the stop.
Whether an individual is obliged to answer these questions is a
different question. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of

217. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); see also Briseno v. INS, 192
F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment is inapplicable in removal proceedings because they are civil).
218. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1).
219. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2009) (authorizing DHS employees to issue detainer
orders for persons already in the custody of other government agencies).
220. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (“We merely hold today that where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in
the area to conduct a carefully limited search.”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 207, at 171–90
(discussing the contemporary parameters of a Terry stop).
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221

Nevada, the Supreme Court concluded that a state could pass a law
that required individuals to identify themselves at the request of law
222
enforcement upon reasonable suspicion of a crime. After Hiibel, if a
state passes a “stop and identify” law, an individual is required to
answer an officer’s request that he identify himself in the course of an
otherwise acceptable Terry stop, and that requirement—under which
the individual must provide his name, but not supporting
223
documentation—does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. But
constitutional stop-and-identify laws under Hiibel are triggered by
224
suspicion of criminal conduct, not civil or technical violations. Yet
most immigrants’ rights groups have advised noncitizens that
authorities enforcing immigration law can require a person to give his
225
name in a state with a stop-and-identify law.
This position reasonably reflects the fact that courts have given
broad authorization to law enforcement to ask questions concerning
immigration status. As Professor Anil Kalhan has noted, “the Court
has edged toward giving a green light to federal, state and local law
enforcement officials to interrogate individuals concerning their
226
[immigration] status in almost any context.” The procedural gap
that exists between immigration-related interrogation and
interrogation in other enforcement contexts may have a corrosive
effect on procedural norms concerning interrogation. Indeed, this
could help to explain the cases in which immigration officials request
information concerning immigration status in ways that exceed their
227
legal authorization.

221. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
222. Id. at 185.
223. Id.
224. Compare Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–53 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a Texas
law requiring an individual, in the absence of any suspicion of wrongdoing, to provide a name
and address to police upon request), with Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185 (affirming the requirement to
identify oneself on reasonable criminal suspicion).
225. See, e.g., ACLU RACIAL JUSTICE PROGRAM ET AL., KNOW YOUR RIGHTS WHEN
ENCOUNTERING LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
kyr/kyr_english.pdf (noting that the requirement to identify oneself exists in “some states”);
NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS AT
HOME AND AT WORK 3 (2008), available at http://www.nilc.org/ce/nilc/imm_enfrcmt_
homework_rts_2008-05.pdf (noting that most states do not require persons to give their name to
law enforcement).
226. Kalhan, supra note 35, at 1208.
227. See, e.g., CHIU ET AL., supra note 34, at 3 (noting that in many ICE home raids,
following unlawful home entries, “agents immediately seize and interrogate all occupants, often
in excess of their legal authority”); NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT & VIOLATIONS OF
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Second, the INA establishes standards for arrest. The plain
language of Section 287 allows for an immigration agent to conduct
an arrest if the agent “has reason to believe that the alien so arrested
228
is in the United States in violation of” immigration law. This
language may appear to suggest a lesser standard for arrest than the
probable cause required to conduct an arrest under criminal law. But
courts have construed this provision to require probable cause to
conduct arrests, finding that the “reason to believe” language requires
229
the equivalent of probable cause, and the language of the statute
makes clear that arrests without warrants are only permissible in
230
exigent circumstances. Nevertheless, it is less clear that the probable
231
cause standard is as exacting in administrative arrests, and the
exigency requirement often seems to be taken for granted by
enforcing agencies and reviewing courts. Again, this means that
immigration enforcement agents may have the authority to arrest in a
slightly broader array of circumstances than those that permit state
and local officials to make arrests when acting in their general law
enforcement capacity. Perhaps this is what has led some ICE officials
4TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 49–51 (discussing immigration status requests that
exceed due process bounds).
228. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2006).
229. United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 1981); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626
F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980); Lee v. INS, 590 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975); Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
accord Contreras v. United States, 672 F.2d 307, 308 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[P]laintiffs do not contest
that the officers had probable cause to believe that plaintiffs were in the country illegally.”
(emphasis added)).
230. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (allowing warrantless arrests only if the noncitizen “is
likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest”).
231. With respect to administrative warrants for immigration enforcement, at least one
court has held that “[p]robable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of
an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be
based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that
‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular (establishment).’” Blackie’s House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d
1211, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978)). But
another court has expressly rejected this conclusion, finding that warrants of inspection used by
the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service required traditional probable cause analysis to
determine whether issuance of a search warrant was constitutional. Int’l Molders’ & Allied
Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 643 F. Supp. 884, 890–91 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
Presumably, the same standard would apply to warrantless arrests in situations in which
warrantless arrests are authorized under the statute. Moreover, even when the initial arrest is
illegal, that illegality does not void a subsequent deportation order based on the alien’s
admission of his status at the hearing. Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d 666, 667 (2d Cir. 1975);
La Franca v. INS, 413 F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir. 1969); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (7th
Cir. 1959); Medeiros v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 634, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (per curiam).

CHACON IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

4/28/2010 5:12:36 PM

A DIVERSION OF ATTENTION?

1609

to make boastful—if legally incorrect—pronouncements that they do
232
not need warrants to conduct arrests in homes.
Third, the INA establishes standards for searches. There are
distinctions between criminal procedural practices and the
immigration enforcement practices outlined in the implementing
regulations for INA section 287. The law requires government
officials to have warrants or consent before an agent can enter a
233
private home or worksite. Although officials may use administrative
warrants to conduct immigration enforcement actions, the law
requires criminal warrants for purposes of gathering criminal
234
evidence. Unfortunately, the line between immigration law and
criminal law is sufficiently blurry that officers are sometimes relying
on administrative warrants in situations in which criminal law
enforcement objectives provide the central justification for the
235
government’s action.
In other cases, officials are conducting
searches and seizures in private homes with no warrants, even though
236
the law clearly requires warrants in this setting. And courts have
232. See Preston, supra note 34 (quoting an ICE official, “We don’t need warrants to make
the arrests”); Ward, supra note 185, at 44 (quoting an arresting agent in Minnesota after a
warrantless raid, who said in response to a question about warrants, “We don’t need one”).
233. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (2009).
234. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230 (1960) (cautioning that the use of the
administrative process in criminal matters “to circumvent the latter’s legal restrictions” would
violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
235. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 34 (noting that raids without warrants were carried out in
efforts to round up 1,300 “gang members” and associates).
236. See, e.g., In re [redacted], No. [redacted] (Immigration Ct. Hartford, Conn. June 2,
2009) (order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to terminate removal
proceedings), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/HartfordGrant-1-6.2.09.pdf (suppressing the respondent’s I-213 because the information therein was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in a warrantless home raid by ICE Fugitive
Operations Team agents); In re P., No. [redacted] (Immigration Ct. N.Y., N.Y June 25, 2008)
(order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to terminate removal
proceedings), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/NY-6-3008.pdf (suppressing evidence obtained in a warrantless home raid and in unlawful interrogations
conducted by a Fugitive Operations Unit); In re Pineda Morales, No. [redacted] (Immigration
Ct. N.Y., N.Y May 13, 2008) (order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress), available at
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/NY-5-13-08.pdf
(suppressing
evidence obtained in a warrantless home raid by an ICE Fugitive Operations Team); see also
Ward, supra note 185, at 45 (noting that at least four lawsuits had been filed in the previous year
alleging illegal home entries by ICE). State and local law enforcement sometimes participate in
these home raids. See Preston, supra note 34 (describing home raids in which local sheriffs
teamed up with immigration officers to raid a Tennessee trailer park); Opinion, Raids Promise
to Make Bad Immigration Situation Worse, TENNESSEAN, Aug. 21, 2007 (online ed., on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (describing local police participation in Maury County raids); Rene
Romo, Suits Fault Immigration “Raid”: Groups Allege Rights Violated, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct.
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declined to suppress evidence seized when ICE officers conduct
arrests in violation of the warrant requirements imposed by the
237
immigration statute.
Fourth, the INA establishes standards for post-arrest
interrogations. Once an arrest has been made, procedure with regard
to interrogations diverges depending on whether the noncitizen has
been arrested for “civil” immigration violations or for criminal
violations. Officials need not give Miranda warnings to civil violators,
such as those who are present unlawfully but are charged with no
238
other immigration violation, as the Fifth Amendment protections
extended to individuals in situations involving “custodial
239
interrogations” since Miranda v. Arizona do not attach in these
240
“civil” proceedings. The INA does specify, however, that the
individual has the right to be represented by counsel at her own
241
expense. In spite of this purported right to counsel, numerous
immigration attorneys have expressed frustration at their inability to
access clients, particularly after large raids at workplaces or
242
residential sites.

18, 2007, at A1 (noting state and local participation in widespread immigration home raids in
Otero, New Mexico, as part of Operation Stone Garden).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[N]othing in the text
of 8 U.S.C. § 1357 provides an independent statutory remedy of suppression for failing to obtain
an administrative [arrest] warrant. Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in reading
such a remedy into the statute. Because the statute authorizing ICE agents to arrest persons for
immigration violations . . . does not require the application of the exclusionary rule to violations
of the statute, we hold that the district court erred in suppressing Abdi’s statements and the
derivative evidence based on the Government’s failure to comply with the statute.” (citation
omitted)). For reasons explored infra, noncitizens often also lack a remedy under the federal
constitution as a result of the Lopez-Mendoza decision.
238. Unlawful presence is a civil, not a criminal, violation. See ALISON SISKIN ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 8 & n.33
(2006).
239. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
240. Courts have found, however, coerced confessions to be suppressible. Bong Youn Choy
v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1960).
241. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
242. See, e.g., Sioban Albiol, R. Linus Chan & Sarah J. Diaz, Re-Interpreting Postville: A
Legal Perspective, 2 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 31, 70 (2008) (noting the limited access to counsel for
Postville detainees); Preston, supra note 34 (discussing the lawsuit in the Tennessee home raids
case); Katherine F. Riordan, Comment, Immigration Law: Enforcing Administrative Exhaustion
Requirements for Pattern and Practice Claims Concerning Due Process Violations During
Immigration Raids—Aguilar v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 42
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 377, 385 & n.54 (2009); Letter from Kathleen Campbell Walker, President,
and Jeanne Butterfield, Executive Dir., AILA, to Linda R. Reade, C.J., U.S. Dist. Court for the
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For criminal violators, Miranda warnings are required in
situations involving custodial interrogations, and an individual has the
right to remain silent in response to questioning, as well as the right to
243
have an attorney present during questioning. But the incentives for
immigration enforcement officials to provide warnings are lower than
in standard criminal cases because the government can still use any
evidence obtained in violation of Miranda in civil deportation
244
proceedings. The absence of an exclusionary rule in removal
proceedings for evidence obtained in violation of Miranda provides
another means of using the illegally obtained testimony of a
noncitizen as evidence against that noncitizen in a highly punitive,
albeit civil, proceeding.
Compounding the disjuncture between civil and criminal
procedures is the gap in remedies when violations of applicable rights
do occur.
B. The Remedy Gap: The Absence of the Suppression Remedy in
Removal Proceedings
Not only do fewer constitutional protections apply in civil
proceedings, but those constitutional protections that do apply—in
particular the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search
and seizure—do not carry the same remedies in civil removal
proceedings as in criminal cases. This is a consequence of the
Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in the case of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,

N. Dist. of Iowa (May 19, 2008), available at http://www.aila.org/ Content/default.aspx?docid=
25440.
243. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45. Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, they should also be informed of their right to contact their consular representative,
but the Supreme Court has recently made this another right without a remedy in the United
States. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356–57 (2008). In Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct.
1346 (2008), the Supreme Court acknowledged the International Court of Justice decision in
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), in
which the ICJ found the United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Convention by
failing to inform criminal defendants of their right to contact their consulate when accused of a
crime. The Court concluded, however, that the ICJ decision was not enforceable in a state court
to preempt state limitations on filing successive habeas petitions, notwithstanding the
president’s Memorandum directing enforcement, because the decision was not “self-executing”;
the remedy under the treaty is referral to the U.N. Security Council. Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356–
57; see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006) (declining to suppress
statements obtained without informing the noncitizen of his rights under Vienna Convention
Article 36 to consular notification and communication).
244. See, e.g., Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1056–57 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
Miranda warnings are not required in deportation proceedings).
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in which the Court addressed the question of whether the
245
exclusionary rule should be applied in civil deportation proceedings.
The Court first noted that suppression was not typically applied
in civil proceedings unless the social benefits of excluding unlawfully
246
seized evidence outweighed the cost of lost evidence. In this case,
the Court found that the deterrence value of the rule would be slight.
First, in most cases, the government would have alternative means of
247
establishing the facts to which the suppressed evidence pertained.
Second, “[e]very INS agent knows . . . that it is highly unlikely that
any particular arrestee will end up challenging the lawfulness of his
248
arrest in a formal deportation proceeding.”
But the third and “perhaps most important” reason the Court
concluded that suppression would offer little deterrence was that “the
INS has its own comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth
249
Amendment violations by its officers.” Internal INS training,
supervision, regulations, and disciplinary procedures for immigration
officers were together sufficient to guard against Fourth Amendment
250
violations. And because a single agency perpetrated the violations,
declaratory relief would be more effective than case-by-case post hoc
251
suppression. Thus, although the Fourth Amendment limitations on
searches and seizures clearly applied to the actions of government
officials engaged in immigration enforcement, when those officials
violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court declined to require

245. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984). Until 1996, immigration
proceedings to prevent noncitizens from entering the country were termed “exclusion”
proceedings, whereas proceedings to remove a noncitizen that had already entered the country
were termed “deportation” proceedings. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 2, at 420–
21. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 consolidated
exclusion and deportation, and labeled the resulting proceedings “removal” proceedings.
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §§ 304, 308, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 to -597, 3009-614
to -625 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006), and 18
U.S.C. § 1015(e)–(f) (2006)). Now, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3) indicates that the removal proceedings
defined in that section are for determining “whether an alien may be admitted to the United
States or, if the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.” This Article
therefore uses the term “removal” to refer to deportation and exclusion.
246. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042.
247. Id. at 1042–43.
248. Id. at 1044.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1044–45.
251. Id. at 1045.
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suppression of the fruits of an illegal search or seizure in civil
252
immigration proceedings.
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Lopez-Mendoza
considered the possibility that the legal landscape could change in
ways that would require revisiting the decision, writing that its
“conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if
there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment
253
violations by INS officers were widespread.” Michael Wishnie
reviewed the conduct of the INS in the period after the LopezMendoza decision and reached the conclusion that the need for the
suppression remedy in removal proceedings had become clear in light
254
of widespread abuses. More recently, Stella Burch Elias has
persuasively argued that the Supreme Court’s “widespread violation”
standard in Lopez-Mendoza has been met, requiring the
255
reinstatement of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings.
Nor are academics the only ones making this argument: noncitizens
have begun to argue for the applicability of the suppression remedy in
immigration proceedings on the ground that the government’s actions
meet the widespread-violation standard set forth in Lopez-Mendoza,
warranting the application of the exclusionary rule in immigration
256
proceedings.
The Lopez-Mendoza plurality also allowed that suppression
would be warranted—even in civil immigration proceedings—in cases
252. Id. at 1050–51.
253. Id. at 1050.
254. Wishnie, supra note 84, at 1102–11 (arguing that national and local data of INS racial
profiling data may “compel reconsideration” of Lopez-Mendoza); cf. Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note,
The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 843, 861
(1998) (making a very broad claim that all INS violations are race based, and therefore
egregious, so as to require suppression under Lopez-Mendoza).
255. Stella Burch Elias, Good Reason to Believe: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the
Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L.
REV. 1109, 1115.
256. See Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 131 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“In
their submissions to the Court, petitioners argue for the first time that Fourth Amendment
violations by immigration authorities are so widespread as to make exclusion appropriate in
these circumstances. Because they did not raise the issue before the [Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA)], it has not been exhausted and is therefore not appropriately before us.”); see
also Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2008) (acknowledging the petitioner’s
argument regarding the widespread nature of Fourth Amendment violations but declining to
review the claim due to Melnitsenko’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies by raising
the argument before the BIA). The author was also asked to consult on a pending immigration
matter involving multiple suppression motions in which counsel has raised an argument
concerning the widespread nature of ICE Fourth Amendment violations.
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involving “egregious” violations of the Fourth Amendment.
Noncitizens have occasionally been able to argue successfully for the
suppression of evidence in immigration proceedings based on
egregious violations. Examples of violations that courts have found to
258
be “egregious” have included stops made solely on the basis of race
259
or of name. Interestingly, the number of circumstances that some
courts are willing to cognize as “egregious violations” has increased a
bit in recent years. Courts have applied the standard to suppress
evidence in cases involving warrantless, nonconsensual entries in
260
which a show of force is used, and have suggested that it would
261
apply to “severe” seizures without adequate justification.
Applying Lopez-Mendoza, courts have also suppressed evidence
in cases involving conduct that, although not “egregious,” still
262
“undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.” Under this
standard, the Second Circuit suppressed evidence obtained in lengthy
custodial interrogations involving substantial sleep deprivation and a
263
failure to warn the noncitizen of his right to counsel. In numerous
other cases involving alleged failures to provide Miranda warnings
and the absence of counsel, however, the courts have declined to
264
suppress the resulting testimonial evidence.
The case law defining what constitutes an “egregious violation”
suggests that immigration judges ruling on these issues must
determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, and if so,
whether that violation was egregious. Thus, ironically, although the
Lopez-Mendoza Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule in

257. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050.
258. Melnitsenko, 517 F.3d at 47; Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994);
see also Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234–37 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that a stop
solely on the basis of race would constitute an “egregious violation,” but finding that the
petitioner’s mere assertion was insufficient to establish that the stop was race based).
259. Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1994).
260. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied
sub nom. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2009); Evans, supra note 140, at
556–57, 557 n.52 (discussing suppression motions granted in five cases based on illegal home
searches and seizures); see also Peitrzak v. Mukasey, 260 F. App’x 334, 340 (2d Cir. 2008)
(suggesting that a nighttime, warrantless home entry could constitute an “egregious” violation).
261. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235.
262. Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 2009).
263. Id. at 215–16.
264. See, e.g., Martins v. Att’y Gen., 306 F. App’x 802, 804–05 (3d Cir. 2009); Lucero v.
Mukasey, 272 F. App’x 612, 613 (9th Cir. 2008) (mem.) (declining suppression when there was
no evidence that the statements were involuntary).
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removal proceedings to keep deportation decisions “streamlined,”
in cases in which allegations of constitutional violations are raised,
immigration judges must still confront suppression questions that
require the application of a complex body of constitutional law.
Notably, in declining to apply the suppression remedy in
immigration proceedings, the Lopez-Mendoza Court assumed that
the government agents committing the constitutional violations in
266
question would be INS officials. This assumption was central to the
Court’s conclusion that the law afforded adequate alternative
267
remedies to suppression. Like many of the other underpinnings of
the Lopez-Mendoza case, this is no longer a valid assumption.
C. Assessing the Impact of the Rights and Remedies Gaps
Allegations of ICE misconduct in various court proceedings in
268
269
270
271
272
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
273
274
275
276
Ohio, New York, and Texas, among other states, speak to the

265. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984).
266. Id. at 1045.
267. Id.
268. Complaint, Slaughter v. DHS, No. 2:09-cv-00433-SRB (D. Ariz. Mar. 4, 2009).
269. E.g., Complaint for Violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Demand for Jury Trial, Reyes v. Alcantar, No.4:07-cv-02271-SBA (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 26, 2007) (alleging the unlawful detention of a seven-year-old citizen in the course of
ICE raids); see also Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en
banc denied sub nom. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an
INS violation of Fourth Amendment rights in Fresno, California, required suppression of
evidence); Comm. for Immigrants Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp.
2d 1177, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (order granting in part and denying in part the defendants’
motion to dismiss) (describing the plaintiffs’ allegation that ICE agents unlawfully targeted
individuals who appeared to be Latino) .
270. Esther Zuckerman & Colin Ross, Immigrants Sue Feds over 2007 Raids, YALE DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/city-news/2009/10/28/immigrants-suefeds-over-2007-raid/.
271. See Aquilar v. ICE, 490 F. Supp. 2d 42, 43 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2007) (alleging rights violations during the New Bedford raid).
272. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Barrera v.
DHS, No. 0:07-cv-03879-JNE-SRN (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2007) (alleging rights violations during the
Swift plant raid); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Arias v. ICE,
No. 0:07-cv-01959-ADM-JSM (D. Minn. Apr. 19, 2007) (raising allegations of violations of the
Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. citizen children during ICE home raids).
273. Emergency Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Writ of Mandamus, Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Motion for a Stay of Removal, Martinez v. Chertoff, No.
1:07-cv-00722-SJD-TSH (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2007) (alleging rights violations during a workplace
raid).
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need for greater remedies to curb abusive practices by ICE in
conducting searches, executing warrants, and making arrests. Yet
section 287(g) instead enables ICE to supervise state and local
government officials acting under the auspices of ICE, thereby
extending rather than containing the risk of rights violations. More
troublingly, the evidence suggests that at least some state and local
law enforcement officers, whether trained under the 287(g) programs
or not, are disregarding the procedural protections that they are
required to afford to the noncitizens they encounter in their official
capacity.
Under section 287(g) agreements, the INA’s statutory and
regulatory guidelines govern the conduct of officials enforcing
277
immigration law. Therefore, the different standards that apply in
immigration enforcement, as distinct from ordinary criminal policing,
extend to state and local police. Moreover, to the extent that the cases
resulting from immigration enforcement actions are civil removal
proceedings, Lopez-Mendoza severely limits remedies for
constitutional violations.
Perhaps it is therefore unsurprising that state and local
participation in immigration enforcement pursuant to section 287(g)
agreements has generated criticisms stemming from what critics have
278
decried as unprofessional and even illegal policing tactics. A

274. Class Action Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Aguilar v. ICE, No. 07-CIV-8224
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007) (alleging rights violations in the course of raids relating to “Operation
Return to Sender”).
275. Original Complaint, Valenzuela v. Swift Beef Co., No. 3:06-cv-02322 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
15, 2006); Complaint, Swift & Co. v. ICE, No. 2:06-cv-00314-J (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2006);
Original Complaint—Class Action Request for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Damages,
United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. Chertoff, No. 2:07-cv-00188-J (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 12, 2007) (alleging rights violations during the Swift plant raid).
276. See Elias, supra note 255, at 1129–31 (discussing lawsuits and media accounts of
constitutional rights violations by ICE across the country); Ward, supra note 185, at 45
(“[W]ithin the last year, ICE has been sued at least four times—the latest in New Jersey—for
allegedly entering homes without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
277. INA § 287(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1357(g)(1) (2006) (allowing the participating state agent to
“perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension or
detention”); id. § 1357(g)(8) (extending federal tort liability standards to participating state
agents). It is an oddity that section 287(g) effectively allows localities—which are not federally
recognized constitutional entities—to contract around the constitutional investigative
restrictions imposed upon their agents by their states, which are federally recognized
constitutional entities. See Su, supra note 85, at 1629 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution does not define
the legal or political role of localities.”).
278. See, e.g., GLADSTEIN ET AL., supra note 116, at 29 (identifying six concerns with
agreements under the program, namely, that (1) they damage immigrants’ safety and civil
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recurring concern is that state and local law enforcement officers
empowered to enforce immigration laws have engaged and will
279
continue to engage in racial profiling targeting Latinos. The most
egregious example to date to confirm this concern is that of the police
department of Maricopa County, Arizona, headed by Sheriff Joe
Arpaio, whose agency stopped so many Latinos after the signing of
the 287(g) agreement that the mayor of Phoenix called for a federal
investigation of his practices, and then-Governor Janet Napolitano of
280
Arizona called for the end of the contract. As Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, Napolitano more recently
281
oversaw the cancellation of Maricopa County’s 287(g) agreement.
Sheriff Arpaio appeared to conclude this would have little impact on
282
his ability to enforce federal immigration law.

liberties; (2) they distract police from their primary crime-fighting responsibilities; (3) police
lack the necessary training; (4) they encourage racial profiling; (5) the National Crime
Information Center database upon which the program relies contains too much incorrect
information; and (6) they will make immigrants reluctant to cooperate with the police and
report information about crimes out of fear of removal). But see Peter H. Schuck, Taking
Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 74–75 (arguing that these concerns
do not justify “categorical opposition” to 287(g) agreements).
279. See Rodríguez, supra note 85, at 635 (“[T]he possibility of racial profiling of Latinos
and mistaken identity rises substantially with state and local involvement.”); Carrie L. Arnold,
Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to Federal
Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 116 (2007) (concluding that federal training was
unlikely to eradicate racial profiling in enforcement under 287(g) agreements); cf. Wishnie,
supra note 84, at 1102 (noting the increased likelihood of racial profiling when state and local
police become involved in immigration enforcement).
280. See Chris Kahn, Governor Pushes for Bigger Effort to Crackdown on Felons,
AZCENTRAL.COM, May 14, 2008, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/05/13/20080513
napolitano0513-ON.html (“Governor Janet Napolitano has ordered the state to end an antiillegal immigration contract with the Maricopa County sheriff so she can pay for a larger effort
to track down thousands of felons around Arizona. Sheriff Joe Arpaio on Tuesday criticized the
governor’s decision as a maneuver to thwart his efforts against illegal immigrants.”); Phoenix
Mayor Seeks DOJ Investigation of Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 85 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1292, 1292–93 (2008) (noting the mayor’s concern that Sheriff Arpaio was engaged in
racial profiling); see also Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (D. Ariz. 2009)
(denying motion to dismiss allegations of racial profiling in traffic stops to ask auto occupants
about their immigration status).
281. Nicholas Riccardi, Arizona Sheriff Ups the Ante Against His Foes, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-joe-arpaio12-2009dec12,0,2123666.
story?page=2/ (“In October, the federal Department of Homeland Security revoked the 287(g)
for Arpaio’s street operations, though he could continue to question jail inmates about their
immigration status.”).
282. Id. (“The day after the federal government told Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio
that he could no longer use his deputies to round up suspected illegal immigrants on the street,
the combative Arizona sheriff did just that.”).
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Although Maricopa County may be an extreme case, it is not an
isolated example. Similar profiling concerns have been raised in other
283
counties with 287(g) agreements. Thus, the training programs that
ICE is providing may be insufficient to curb racial profiling, which has
a long history of surfacing when local law enforcement becomes
engaged in immigration enforcement. Compounding the lack of
training is a lack of sufficient federal oversight, not only with regard
to the specific issue of racial profiling, but with regard to 287(g)
284
program objectives and operations more generally.
As less formalized modes of cooperation, such as the Secure
Communities initiative, rapidly expand, it is worth noting that the
lack of alignment between procedural remedies in the criminal and
civil contexts may have specific consequences for these programs as
well. It is true that they do not increase the powers of state and local
officials, but they do create a potential shelter for illegal government
conduct in the form of civil removal proceedings. An illegal arrest or
interrogation carried out by a local police officer will, for all of the
reasons just stated, be without a remedy in removal proceedings if the
noncitizen is removable and his matter is funneled into immigration
285
proceedings. Unless an immigration judge is prepared to rule that
283. See, e.g., Sherry Greenfield, Authorities Announce Changes to the Controversial 287(g)
Program, The Policies and Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement Laws: 287(g) Program in
North Carolina, AMER. C.L. UNION N.C., Feb. 18, 2009, http://acluofnc.org/?q=new-study-findsdramatic-problems-287g-immigration-program; Andrea Simmons, Is Sheriff a Hero or Racial
Profiler?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 12, 2009, at A1 (“The ACLU of Georgia has compiled
into a report the accounts of 10 people who had experiences of racial profiling in Cobb County,
along with interviews of five community activists or attorneys.”).
284. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 5 (noting that the program
lacked documented objectives, that ICE “has not described the nature and extent of its
supervision . . . which has led to wide variation in the perception of the nature and extent of
supervisory responsibility among ICE field officials and officials from the participating
agencies,” and that ICE “did not define what data should be tracked or how it should be
collected and reported”).
Another concern raised by 287(g) agreements is that law enforcement participation in
immigration enforcement may strain the ability of participating local police departments to
focus on crime control. When local law enforcement officers are engaged in immigration
enforcement, they are not available to conduct investigations and detentions in cases involving
violent crime. At the same time, many of the immigration violators whom they detain are not
engaged in criminal activity, raising questions about whether immigration enforcement
constitutes the most effective use of local resources. See, e.g., GLADSTEIN, supra note 116, at 5
(“Historically, police departments primarily concerned themselves with enforcement of criminal
law, while the federal government had exclusive responsibility for addressing civil immigration
violations.”).
285. In contrast, if immigration agents conduct illegal arrests and the matter winds up in
criminal court rather than immigration court, judges in criminal cases are in a position to police
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the illegal state action was “egregious” and that the evidence should
be suppressed despite the fact that the action in question was not
undertaken by ICE but rather by state officials, there will be no
redress for constitutional violations.
Although agents of the INS’s successor agencies—Immigration
and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection—are
still the primary enforcers of immigration law, state and local law
enforcement agents throughout the country now participate in
286
287
immigration enforcement activities.
In Mapp v. Ohio,
the
Supreme Court concluded that unless the exclusionary rule were
applied to state and local law enforcement in criminal proceedings,
“the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom
from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this
Court’s high regard as a freedom ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
288
liberty.’” As these same actors come to play a central role in
enforcing immigration laws, it seems apparent that the Fourth
Amendment rights discussed in Mapp risk ephemeral status in a
significant number of law enforcement actions. The gap between the
rights and remedies available in criminal proceedings and those
available in civil removal cases raises the genuine possibility that
immigrants whose constitutional rights are violated will be served to
289
ICE on a silver platter for removal.

the conduct of these officers through the imposition of the exclusionary rule in state court
criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Rangel-Portillo, 586 F.3d 376, 381, 383 (5th Cir.
2009) (reversing the conviction based on evidence obtained by CBP in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and subsequently introduced in federal criminal court); State v. MaldonadoArreaga, 772 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (suppressing biographical information
provided by a noncitizen detainee after a warrantless raid by ICE Fugitive Operations Team
agents).
286. See supra Part II.
287. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
288. Id. at 655.
289. See, e.g., In re Sanchez, No. A 98 300 503, slip op. at 5–6 (Immigration Ct. Hartford,
Conn. Jan. 31, 2008) (order denying the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to
terminate removal proceedings) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that even if the
court accepted Sanchez’s claim that he was illegally arrested by local law enforcement prior to
being turned over to ICE for removal, “the exclusionary rule does not apply . . . because ICE
merely relied in good faith on the evidence gathered by [the Danbury Police
Department]. . . . [E]ven if the DPD obtained information from the Respondent in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule would not apply to bar said evidence from the
current [removal] proceeding”).

CHACON IN FINAL.DOC

1620

4/28/2010 5:12:36 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1563

D. More Rights Gaps Ahead? Lower Protections for Noncitizens in
Criminal Proceedings
There is also some indication that the slippage in procedural
protections threatens to spread from immigration court to the
criminal court. Although the law has long provided constitutional
criminal procedural protections to citizens and noncitizens alike,
some troubling developments in criminal courts suggest that courts
will be less zealous in protecting the rights of noncitizens in criminal
proceedings. This may in part be a result of the normalization of
lower procedural protections that has been established in the civil
realm, and that has persisted even as civil removal proceedings have
290
become increasingly punitive.
First, some courts have begun to raise doubts about the
applicability of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures to certain noncitizens even in criminal
proceedings. Federal District Court Judge Cassell of Utah has handed
down the most visible of these decisions. In United States v. Esparza291
Mendoza, Judge Cassell concluded that the “persons” protected by
the Fourth Amendment did not include certain unauthorized
292
migrants.
In reaching this decision, Judge Cassell relied on the Supreme
293
Court’s earlier ruling in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, in which
the majority of the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia,
concluded that Fourth Amendment protections did not apply to
prevent the illegal seizure of a noncitizen not present on U.S. soil at
294
the time of the seizure. The Supreme Court had declined to apply
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures to a
Mexican national who was apprehended in Mexico and brought to
295
trial in the United States. In Esparza-Mendoza, Judge Cassell
reasoned that the holding applied equally to certain noncitizens
actually present on U.S. soil. He concluded that a noncitizen who had
reentered the United States in violation of a prior removal order

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Legomsky, supra note 43, at 512.
United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003).
Id. at 1265.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Id. at 269.
Id. at 262.
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lacked sufficient connection to the political community to be a part of
296
the “people” that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.
Critics have contended that Judge Cassell’s conclusion is
supported neither by the text nor by the history of the Fourth
297
Amendment. Nevertheless, at least one other court has followed the
lead taken by Judge Cassell in reasoning that Fourth Amendment
298
protections do not apply to certain noncitizens. This is not yet a
299
widespread phenomenon, but it is important, because as the number
of criminal prosecutions for immigration crimes rises, the possibility
of a broad exception to the rules of criminal procedure in cases
involving unauthorized noncitizens could have an impact not only on
ICE conduct, but also on the conduct of state and local police. No
longer deterred by the federal exclusionary rule, which would require
the suppression of evidence in cases involving illegal searches, police
at all levels of government might be more inclined to conduct
warrantless searches in cases in which the target of the search is
300
undocumented. This would be true whether the nature of the
investigation was criminal or civil.
Second, the criminal courts have recently become the sites of
301
mass plea agreements related to immigration enforcement. These

296. Id. at 271.
297. See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, Exploring the Use of the Word “Citizen” in Writings on the
Fourth Amendment, 83 IND. L.J. 1557, 1581–83 (2008); see also VICTOR C. ROMERO,
ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 69–75
(2005) (criticizing the reasoning of Esparza-Mendoza); Kalhan, supra note 35, at 1195 n.229
(noting that the Esparza-Mendoza decision rests on an interpretation of Verdugo-Urquidez that
is inconsistent with Justice Kennedy’s outcome-decisive plurality opinion); Kal Raustiala, The
Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2523 (2005) (critiquing the reasoning of this
and other cases as relying on a conception of rights that “is not especially consistent with
American practice”).
298. See United States v. Gutierrez-Casada, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1265–67 (D. Kan. 2008);
see also Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 09-97, 2009 WL 1511176, at *2 (May 22, 2009) (relying on
both Gutierrez-Casada and Esparza-Mendoza in outlining the applicable rights of noncitizens).
299. More widespread, but as yet of uncertain impact, is the tendency of courts to refer in
dicta to Fourth Amendment rights as the rights of “citizens.” See Medina, supra note 297, at
1557. This reading, taken literally, would be even narrower than Judge Cassell’s reading because
it would exclude not only unauthorized noncitizens, but all noncitizens, including both lawful
permanent residents and nonimmigrants present on temporary visas. To date, no one has
argued that such a reading of the Fourth Amendment is correct, but the casual imposition of a
citizenship requirement into the doctrines concerning Fourth Amendment protections is
troubling.
300. The exclusionary rule has long been considered a critical factor in Fourth Amendment
compliance. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 665 (1961).
301. Chacón, supra note 10, at 145.
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mass plea agreements are dehumanizing at best, and at worst
abrogate defendants’ due process rights. One reviewing court has
acknowledged that such procedures simply do not comport with
302
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Nevertheless, tens of
thousands of immigrants have been—and presumably will continue to
be—processed in these insufficient proceedings because the courts
have made no move to provide a remedy for the procedural
303
violations.
E. Why Worry Now?
Several legal and demographic trends are converging that create
a renewed need to examine the procedural protections that apply in
the context of immigration law enforcement. First, immigration
enforcement in the interior of the United States (as opposed to at the
304
border) is on the rise. Second, there is a substantial and growing
number of noncitizens present in the United States potentially subject
305
Finally, local, state, and federal law
to ICE jurisdiction.
enforcement officers are increasingly using immigration law as a
306
means of achieving criminal law enforcement goals. The increasing
participation of state and local law enforcement officials in internal
immigration law enforcement both reflects and reifies this third trend.
Immigration control has become not only an objective of law
enforcement, but also a tool for achieving crime-control goals more
generally.
Even as the goals of criminal and immigration law enforcement
converge, the procedural rules that govern them remain divergent.
The procedural rules that constrain the actions of government
officials engaged in immigration enforcement are slightly less
restrictive than comparable rules in criminal law enforcement. The
absence of a suppression remedy in removal proceedings also means
that there is less deterrence for violating those rules than would be
the case in a criminal investigation. Growing evidence suggests that
these gaps between the rights and remedies available to noncitizens in
removal proceedings and those available to noncitizens in criminal
proceedings have encouraged more aggressive forms of policing in
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.; see also Chacón, supra note 10, at 137 (discussing this issue).
See supra Part I.A.
See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
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307

immigrant communities. As the relaxed procedural norms that have
long applied to immigration enforcement make their way into the
daily policing of immigrant neighborhoods, the erosion of criminal
procedural protections that began with the aggressive war on drugs of
the 1980s and 1990s now continues as a byproduct of immigration
enforcement.
IV. SOLUTIONS
The final Part of this Article proposes policy reforms to address
the procedural problems previously identified. The application of the
exclusionary rule to removal proceedings is a meritorious proposal to
address the procedural problems previously discussed, and it is
considered in Section IV.A.
Even if the exclusionary rule were applied in immigration
proceedings, however, immigration courts would still lack the
authority and capacity to address many of the rights violations
occurring in the course of immigration enforcement. Immigration
courts are overburdened and largely untrained in Fourth and Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence. They also may lack jurisdiction over
fundamental constitutional questions. Compounding the problems in
immigration courts, federal district courts are increasingly declining
to exercise jurisdiction over the civil class action claims that might
serve as another deterrent to official misconduct in immigration
policing. And the agencies responsible for immigration policing are
not subject to the kind of oversight that the Lopez-Mendoza Court
seemed to suggest was essential to preventing widespread rights
abuses.
Therefore, Part IV.B includes a discussion of the need for
comprehensive reform to the immigration adjudication structure, and
provides some guiding principles for such reform. Finally, Part IV.C
identifies mechanisms for increasing the oversight of immigration
policing outside of the immigration court system through expanded
availability of class action remedies in federal district court and
through improved agency oversight procedures for federal
immigration enforcement agents. The proposals are not
comprehensive; this Article seeks only to illustrate the need for more
systematic reforms to address the rights violations discussed above,
and to provide some preliminary guidelines for such reforms.

307. See supra Part III.C.
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A. Applying the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Proceedings
In recent years, several commentators have concluded that the
evidence of increasing constitutional violations by immigration
enforcement officials requires the application of the exclusionary rule
308
in immigration proceedings. Certainly, if the reasoning of LopezMendoza is taken at face value, it seems that a strong case can be
309
made for doing so. Indeed, a growing number of the violations
taking place are not committed by federal immigration officials, but
by the very state and local law enforcement agencies that the
Supreme Court previously determined would require deterrence
310
through the exclusionary rule.
Although the application of the exclusionary rule seems logical
given the evolution of the nature of immigration enforcement and the
purpose of removal proceedings, it is also important to recognize that
the exclusion remedy will be of only limited effectiveness in the
context of removal proceedings for at least three reasons. First,
because the government is not required to provide counsel to
noncitizens in civil immigration proceedings, a significant number of
311
individuals in removal proceedings are not represented by counsel.
Although representation by counsel is not a necessary predicate for
raising an argument for the exclusion of illegally seized evidence, it
seems unlikely that noncitizens representing themselves generally will
have the capacity to raise this kind of claim in removal proceedings.
Second, in many removal proceedings, the nature of the evidence
illegally seized ensures that even when suppression occurs, the
312
noncitizen will still be removable. Thus, in many cases in which the

308. Elias, supra note 255, at 1114; Wishnie, supra note 84, at 1102–11; Hafetz, supra note
254, at 845; Matthew S. Mulqueen, Note, Rethinking the Role of the Exlcusionary Rule in
Removal Proceedings, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2008).
309. See Elias, supra note 255, at 1114; Mulqueen, supra note 308, at 1160.
310. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 332–36 and accompanying text.
312. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1035–36 (1984) (noting that many facts in the I213 will not be subject to suppression); see also Kalhan, supra note 35, 1189–91 (discussing the
fact that much evidence will be admissible even if illegally seized). It is important to note,
however, that in at least some circuits, identity evidence seized illegally is suppressible. Compare
United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 2007) (deciding that Lopez-Mendoza
permits suppression of impermissibly obtained identity information), United States v. OlivaresRangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Lopez-Mendoza as merely reiterating
a long-standing jurisdictional rule), United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir.
2004) (same), and United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754–55 (8th Cir. 2001)
(same), with United States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2006) (interpreting Lopez-
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government has engaged in unlawful investigatory or detention
tactics, the incentives for noncitizens to raise suppression arguments
may be low. This is particularly true because, over the past two
decades, the Supreme Court has gradually shrunk the sphere of
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights violations requiring suppression
in criminal cases, and those limits would apply in civil proceedings,
313
too, if the exclusionary rule were extended to such proceedings.
Third, it is not entirely clear that immigration courts are fully
empowered to hear claims arising out of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations. Immigration courts are able to decide matters
involving violations of federal immigration regulations. Although
such violations do not require application of the suppression remedy,
immigration courts can terminate proceedings in cases in which a
regulatory violation prejudices interests protected by the violated
314
regulation. Presumably, termination might be appropriate in certain
cases involving violations of regulations protecting noncitizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
As previously noted, however, the protections of the federal
regulations with regard to searches and seizures do not align
315
completely with constitutional criminal procedural protections. An
immigration court cannot rule on constitutional challenges to any of
the federal regulations governing the conduct of an immigration
enforcement officer or deputized state or local agent. Immigration
courts can decide constitutional challenges to “procedures that they

Mendoza as barring suppression of evidence of identity), United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420
F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 2005) (same), and United States v. Roque-Villanueva, 175 F.3d 345, 346
(5th Cir. 1999) (same).
313. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 602 (2006) (declining to apply the
exclusionary rule in a case involving a violation of the well-established “knock and announce”
requirement of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004)
(declining to apply the exclusionary rule to physical evidence that was the fruit of an unMirandized statement).
314. See, e.g., In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 325, 328 (B.I.A. 1980). At least one
immigration court has noted, however, that “there is no clear holding sanctioning that a
violation of a regulation could result in termination of proceedings, thereby allowing a
respondent to continue his unlawful presence in the United States, absent egregious conduct.”
In re [redacted], No. [redacted], slip op. at 22 (Immigration Ct. Hartford, Conn. June 2, 2009)
(order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to terminate removal
proceedings), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/HartfordGrant-1-6.2.09.pdf.
315. See supra Part III.A.
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can correct administratively,” but not questions of whether the
regulations themselves are constitutional. And, in spite of
immigration judges’ long track record of deciding Fourth and Fifth
Amendment suppression claims, it is actually not entirely clear
whether Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims raise the kind of
procedural question that IJs have jurisdiction to consider. Federal
appellate courts have implicitly approved immigration courts’ rulings
317
on constitutional claims, but immigration courts frequently buttress
their Fourth and Fifth Amendment decisions by also finding
318
violations of the relevant implementing regulation.
Finally, the Lopez-Mendoza Court makes the case that
immigration judges lack the institutional competency to address these
claims. In Lopez-Mendoza, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court,
wrote:
The average immigration judge handles about six deportation
hearings per day . . . . Neither the hearings officers nor the attorneys
participating in those hearings are likely to be well versed in the
intricacies of Fourth Amendment law. The prospect of even
occasional invocation of the exclusionary rule might significantly
319
change and complicate the character of these proceedings.

O’Connor goes on to quote from the Board of Immigration Appeals
brief, which presented suppression issues as “a diversion of attention
from the main issues which those proceedings were designed to
320
resolve.” If this conclusion is taken at face value, it raises some very
pressing concerns. First, because of the increase in immigration
enforcement, immigration judges’ workload has not decreased since
1984 despite an increase in their numbers. In 2007, the 214

316. Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from
Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 388 (2000).
317. See, e.g., Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 127 (2d Cir. 2008); Almeida-Amaral
v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 2006).
318. See, e.g., In re [redacted], No. [redacted], slip op. at 14 (Immigration Ct. L.A., Cal. Jan.
8, 2010) (order granting the respondent’s motion to suppress and motion to terminate removal
proceedings), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/LA-1-810.pdf (“[T]he Court finds that Respondent experienced both actual and presumptive prejudice
as a result of the Government’s violations of the regulation under 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.8(b) and
(c).”).
319. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048–49 (1984) (citations omitted).
320. Id. at 1048.
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immigration judges in the United States handled 1,500 cases each.
Moreover, the complexity of these cases has increased, because the
actors involved in immigration enforcement are more numerous and
come out of a wide variety of agencies. To the extent that “[n]either
the hearings officers nor the attorneys participating in those hearings
are likely to be well versed in the intricacies of Fourth Amendment
322
law,” the current system is virtually assured of creating bad results
in at least some of the cases in which valid suppression arguments are
raised.
At the time that the Lopez-Mendoza Court considered the
question of whether evidence illegally seized could be used in
deportation proceedings, they were operating on a relatively blank
slate. In its decision, the Court noted that “lower court decisions
323
dealing with this question [were] sparse,” and cited only three cases.
324
Today, such motions are far more numerous. Yet, there is nothing
to suggest that IJs today receive better training on Fourth
Amendment law than was the case in 1984.
This suggests not only that immigration courts are not required
to suppress illegally seized evidence in matters in which such
suppression would be required in criminal proceedings, but also that
the EOIR has made no concerted effort in the years since LopezMendoza to ensure that these courts will be prepared to deal more
effectively with these claims as they arise. Given the increasingly
seamless connections between law enforcement at all levels of
government and immigration enforcement officials, the ability to
adequately address suppression issues should now be identified as a
core competency of the immigration judge and not a peripheral
diversion of attention.

321. See Jennifer Ludden, Immigration Crackdown Overwhelms Judges, NPR, Feb. 9, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100420476 (quoting Dana Leigh Marks,
Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges).
322. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048.
323. Id. at 1041.
324. Elias, supra note 255, at 1126–27 (“EOIR records show that between 1952 and 1979—
the year that the Lopez-Mendoza respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias SandovalSanchez first appeared in immigration court—fewer than fifty motions to suppress evidence or
terminate proceedings had ever been filed in immigration court. Twenty-eight years later, in
2007 alone, 21,144 motions to terminate were granted.”).
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B. Immigration Court Reform
The issue of suppression thus raises a larger set of questions
around immigration court competencies. There can be no doubt that
immigration judges carry a heavy burden under the system’s current
structure, even though they do not have to sift through evidentiary
suppression issues in many matters.
The immigration court system is also riddled with other problems
that flow from or compound the issues associated with the heavy
workload. In recent years, circuit courts have engaged in round
denunciations of immigration judges’ performances in various
325
matters. Most notably, Judge Richard Posner was moved to claim
that adjudication by immigration judges had “fallen below the
326
minimum standards of legal justice.” Moreover, in recent times, the
immigration bench has been the subject of political manipulation that
has raised questions concerning the integrity of the institution as a
327
328
whole. The time is ripe for institutional reform.
Although a full reform plan is well beyond the scope of this
Article, the preceding discussion should make clear that any reform
effort needs to take into account several institutional concerns. First,
immigration judges should be fully trained to recognize and
adjudicate constitutional violations that occur during the course of
ICE investigations. Such training should focus significant attention on
the substantial role of state and local law officials in immigration
enforcement efforts, so that judges are prepared to understand the
complex interaction of actors that may be involved when noncitizens
appearing before them raise allegations of rights violations. Many
reform proposals have called for even broader changes to the nation’s
immigration courts, including the creation of an Article I immigration
329
court in which judges would have a guaranteed tenure, the removal
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review from the Justice
330
Department to guarantee greater decisional independence, and the

325. Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
2005, at A1.
326. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).
327. Emma Schwartz & Jason McLure, DOJ Made Immigration Judgeships Political, LEGAL
TIMES, May 28, 2007, at 12.
328. See Legomsky, supra note 14, at 1637–41 (calling for a restructuring of the immigration
adjudication system).
329. Id. at 1678–81(summarizing and critiquing such proposals).
330. Id. at 1683–85 (summarizing and critiquing such proposals).
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creation of an independent administrative immigration court system
whose decisions would be appealable to an Article III immigration
331
court. These broader proposals are not inconsistent with a narrower
call for increased training concerning government investigations. Any
reform agenda ought to include measures to sensitize immigration
judges to the important role they now must play in policing large
numbers of the nation’s police.
Second, noncitizens should be provided with counsel in removal
proceedings. During the first eight years of the new millennium, over
eight hundred thousand noncitizens went through removal
332
proceedings without access to counsel; 84 percent of detained
333
noncitizens lack counsel. A case can be made for not guaranteeing
all of these noncitizens a right to counsel in civil removal
334
proceedings, but in many cases, denial of counsel in removal
proceedings seems to violate basic concepts of procedural fairness
335
and due process. When a Fourth Amendment violation occurs
during a search or a seizure, or when a due process violation occurs
during the government’s interrogation of a noncitizen, unrepresented

331. Id. at 1686–1721 (offering such a proposal).
332. EOIR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 fig.9 (2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy07syb.pdf.
333. NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND
PROMOTING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL
ORIENTATION PROGRAM 1 (2008), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=1780/
LOP%2BEvaluation_May2008_final.pdf.
334. See, e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated
Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 289, 345–46 (2008) (arguing for a right to counsel in removal proceedings for
individuals previously admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents). This
approach risks providing no counsel to a wide variety of individuals subject to removal who
might have legitimate due process concerns. For example, this proposal would not apply to an
H-1B visa holder, present in the U.S. for six years, with strong family and employment ties to
the country. It would not apply to an unauthorized noncitizen who has been in the country for
thirty years and has established extensive family ties or a noncitizen who entered the country
unlawfully as a small child and has never known any other home. Nevertheless, this proposal
provides a useful starting point for thinking about appropriate cases in which to guarantee the
right to counsel, and it may be that a good case can be made for denying the right to very recent
entrants who either lack legal status or whose legal entry is authorized only by short-term
nonimmigrant visas. See Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to
Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 114 (2008) (arguing for a right to
counsel for detained noncitizens in removal proceedings).
335. See sources cited supra note 334; see also DONALD KERWIN, MIGRATION POLICY
INST., INSIGHT NO. 4, REVISITING THE NEED FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL 1, 3 (2004), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf (critiquing the denial of counsel for
its negative effect on the fairness and legitimacy of the removal process).
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immigrants are unlikely to be able to adequately address the complex
legal issues that a suppression motion requires. This is particularly
true given the fact that immigration judges do not have a long history
of dealing with these arguments, lack extensive training in these
336
matters, and often require in-depth briefing on related issues.
C. Reforms Outside of the Immigration Court
In addition to changing the procedures and structure of
immigration courts, ensuring adequate policing of the many actors
now engaged in immigration enforcement will require adjustments to
institutions outside of the immigration courts. In particular, reforms
are needed to ensure that two other constitutional safeguards cited by
the Lopez-Mendoza Court—civil damage remedies and internal
agency disciplinary measures—operate to provide adequate
deterrence of constitutional rights violations.
First, Congress should revisit jurisdictional restrictions that
prevent courts from hearing pattern-and-practice claims concerning
ICE practices. As ICE enforcement actions proliferate and expand in
scope and ambition, it is almost unavoidable that the agency will
commit occasional rights violations. The possibility of such problems
is magnified by the recent, large increase in the number of new ICE
337
many of whom have not completed their training
agents,
requirements before beginning their participation in enforcement
338
actions. The Lopez-Mendoza Court suggested that civil suits would
be one way to keep agency action in check in the absence of a
339
suppression remedy. The rising number of civil actions suggests that
this is indeed a viable mechanism by which to curb certain abuses of
power.
It is important to recognize, however, that Congress has made
substantial changes to the law since Lopez-Mendoza was decided in
1984, and these changes have limited the ability of noncitizens to file
civil actions in cases in which government agents have violated
constitutional rights in the course of immigration enforcement. In
particular, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

336. Ward, supra note 185, at 46 (quoting a former attorney advisor for the San Francisco
Immigration Court for the proposition that immigration judges “often seek significant research”
in deciding suppression motions).
337. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
338. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 92, at 20–21.
339. See United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1984).
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Responsibility Act of 1996 enacted limitations to judicial review, and
the REAL ID Act of 2005 requires administrative exhaustion and
limits judicial review for certain matters arising out of immigration
340
proceedings. Some courts have held that the jurisdictional bars
codified in section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
preclude federal district courts from deciding pattern-and-practice
claims arising out of ICE enforcement that led to the initiation of
removal proceedings against the petitioning noncitizens.
For example, the petitioners in Aguilar v. Immigration and
341
Customs Enforcement had filed a class-wide claim alleging that ICE
engaged in a pattern and practice of violating due process during
342
immigration raids in New Bedford, Massachusetts. The petitioners
argued that the statutory limitations on judicial review did not bar
their claim because they were not challenging their removal orders,
343
but rather were seeking relief arising out of ICE’s illegal conduct.
The First Circuit rejected this argument, concluding that the claims
arose from removal and that petitioners had adequate mechanisms
344
for addressing rights violations in removal proceedings. This ruling
captures a broader trend wherein the courts have read class-action
jurisdiction-stripping provisions broadly in the context of immigration
345
law. Such interpretations threaten one of the most effective means
that noncitizens have to challenge illegalities in immigration law and
346
procedures.
Given the increasing judicial resistance to the suppression
remedy, and the particular difficulties in suppressing the kinds of
evidence that are frequently at issue in removal proceedings, civil
340. INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). See generally Jill E. Family, Another Limit on
Federal Court Jurisdiction? Immigrant Access to Class-Wide Injunctive Relief, 53 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 11, 23–27 (2006) (discussing IIRIRA’s limitations on federal jurisdiction); Nancy
Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future? Lessons Learned from Litigation over the 1996
Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113 (2007) (discussing the legal issues
raised by the 2005 revisions to the INA’s judicial review provisions).
341. Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
342. Id. at 9. For a discussion of the case, see Riordan, supra note 242, at 378–79.
343. Riordan, supra note 242, at 378–79.
344. Id. (citing Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 10).
345. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Threats to the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 110–16 (2008) (discussing Supreme Court interpretations of these
provisions); see also Motomura, supra note 316, at 414 (arguing for a narrow interpretation of
jurisdiction-stripping provisions).
346. See Family, supra note 345, at 76–81 (discussing the use of class actions for these
purposes). Immigration reform proposals to date have included provisions seeking to further
restrict the class action in immigration-related matters. Id. at 118–21.
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remedies may be the only avenue toward remediation that remains
available to some noncitizens. Thus, to be truly effective, adoption of
the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings would need to be
accompanied by a reduction of the existing barriers to class actions
arising out of constitutional rights violations in immigration
enforcement.
Up to this point, the solutions presented have focused on the
courts as the site for remediating and deterring constitutional
violations in immigration enforcement. But the Lopez-Mendoza
decision correctly notes that internal agency policies are also critical
347
to the deterrence and punishment of illegal actions by agents.
Unfortunately, there is evidence that the internal investigative and
disciplinary measures that might help to prevent rights violations are
in need of fine tuning. Therefore, the final issue tackled in this Article
is the need for more effective internal measures at the Department of
Homeland Security to address rights violations by its immigration
enforcement agents.
ICE is now the largest law enforcement agency in the country.
By its own estimation, it also works with tens of thousands of state
and local law enforcement officials throughout the country. It has the
ability to initiate removal proceedings against over 10 percent of the
U.S. population, and its actions affect countless others. Yet, in terms
of accountability, it looks very different from other large police forces
in the United States. Whereas about 80 percent of police departments
in the nation’s fifty largest cities are subject to the oversight of a
348
civilian control board, ICE has no such oversight mechanism. In
this, of course, it is very much like other federal law enforcement
agencies, which have long resisted external review. But as ICE
becomes a hub for a whole host of state and local law enforcement
efforts, it seems increasingly important to consider the possibility that
external oversight might be appropriate and necessary to keeping
rights violations in check.
It is also extremely difficult to access the basic statistical data
about ICE enforcement that would be necessary for any observer to
effectively monitor the agency’s practice. To ensure compliance with
constitutional requirements by ICE and the state and local agents

347. See United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1054 (1984) (discussing the
importance of the INS’s internal disciplinary scheme for remedying constitutional violations).
348. SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT 40
(2001).
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who are increasingly charged with assisting in enforcing the nation’s
immigration laws, it is critical that these agencies be required to retain
and report data that reveal the nature and effectiveness of their
enforcement efforts.
CONCLUSION
The procedural consequences of ongoing changes in immigration
enforcement should not be ignored. This Article seeks to highlight
the genuinely transformative effect that contemporary immigration
policing arrangements are having on criminal procedural norms. The
immigration courts provide the institutional space where many of the
questions over these procedures will be resolved. Unfortunately,
these institutions cannot effectively address many of the issues that
are now becoming staples of immigration court adjudication. Even if
the procedural protections of the criminal realm—such as the
exclusionary rule—are imported into these institutional settings, it is
not clear that these tools can be effectively deployed. The
transformation of immigration policing requires a parallel
transformation of immigration adjudication. Creating more effective
oversight mechanisms and reforming immigration adjudication are
both necessary steps to ensure the adequate policing of those who
police migration.

